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## THESIS

In the Mind's Eye:  
Cultural Influence in Defense Analysis and Strategic Planning

by

Christopher Bruce Chace

June 1990

Thesis Advisor:

Frank M. Teti

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In the Mind's Eye:  
Cultural Influence in Defense Analysis and Strategic Planning

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy  
B.S., Florida State University, 1978


Submitted in partial fulfillment of  
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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## ABSTRACT

This study examines the fundamental influence that culture has on the process and products of defense analysis and strategic planning. It demonstrates that culture, as the primary source of the policy-maker's epistemology, is an essential determinant of the outputs of the strategic planning process. Culture has this effect because strategic planning is nothing more than a collection of considered judgments, but judgments made through the "perceptual lens" created by one's own culture. The study looks at the components of culture: how and why it forms, is maintained, and changes in support of a specific group's internal integration and external adaptation functions. Through this effort, culture is exposed as a primary cause of individual and collective behavior. As such, it is presented as a principal source of data for understanding and explaining national behavior in the international environment. Concurrently, the study shows that strategic planning, as a fundamentally value-laden process, is highly susceptible to the negative effects of a perspective biased by the planner's own acculturation. Therefore, the subjects of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism are examined. This study also investigates the concepts of "strategic culture" and "national style" in strategy. It shows that strategic culture may be analyzed as the culture of a nation's "security community." National style, in turn, is presented as an artifact of the strategic culture. Finally, a "strategic behavior model" is presented and briefly tested to demonstrate the methodological linkage between strategic-cultural assumptions and specific security behavior.



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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

This thesis takes a rather untraditional approach to the study of defense analysis and strategic planning, and it does so to serve both an informative and an explanatory task. The informative task is to heighten the awareness of the analyst and planner to the subtle influence that culture has on one's "perspective," and to suggest the effect this can have on their strategic choices. The explanatory task is to show how this knowledge may be expanded and further applied to the study of national security affairs.

In the most general terms, then, this study examines the process and products of "acculturation" as the fundamental source of one's perspective. In this manner, the thesis attempts to show that an understanding of culture and its influence can be of paramount importance to those whose task is evaluating and planning for national defense. This thesis will also demonstrate that strategy itself is intrinsically dependent upon one's perspective.

Concurrently, the study will expand the basic subject area to include a new and still underdeveloped application of culture as a source of national behavior. This area of research concentrates on a new analytical construct, "strategic culture," and its derivative affect, "national style," in security behavior.

### **A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES**

The reason for this study is twofold: first, although the fundamental affect of culture is well known, it does not appear that this knowledge is routinely presented to students or

practitioners as a source of concern in defense analysis or strategic planning.<sup>1</sup> This thesis addresses this area in detail and shows how this deficiency can be a source of "misjudgment" in strategy formation.

Secondly, although the subject area has traditionally been reserved for anthropologists, it has begun to receive widespread (albeit hesitant) usage in the study of international affairs.<sup>2</sup> More recently, it has piqued the interest of students of national security affairs as well. Apparently, scholars have recognized the potential value of this topic area and are willing to explore it in more depth. However, they are still in the earliest stages of applying it to "national" behavior. Several foreign affairs specialists have investigated the affects of culture on national behavior before, and although this area of study lost favor in the heyday of the "behaviorists," it appears to be regaining respect in the field today.<sup>3</sup> As a result of this renewed effort, a number of new methods to account for the "imponderable" effects of a society's culture are available for use in this and other areas of study. As an application of the new methodology, one group of defense analysts, for example, has begun to

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<sup>1</sup>The affects of culture on perspective have been of interest to social scientists for at least 90 years. For example, the first reference to "ethnocentrism," which refers to a culture-specific perspective, appears in a 1906 text by William Sumner, *Folkways*, (Boston: Ginn Co., 1906), p. 13. Also, for recent applications of the phenomenon for security students, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1976).

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, the arguments in favor of this transition by Hugh V. Emy, "From a Positive to a Cultural Science: Toward a New Rationale for Political Studies," *Political Studies*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, (1989), pp. 188-204.

<sup>3</sup>International relations scholars are currently engaged in a "debate" of sorts that somewhat debunks the "rational" and "empirical" models in use for the past twenty years. Critics of these models and methods argue that, in neglecting the "imponderable" variables (such as culture), the methodology neglects a great deal of valid data. See for example, the collection of articles recently published in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (September 1989), especially Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," pp. 235-254; and Thomas J. Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations," pp. 263-267. Additionally, one recent study of U.S. foreign policy emphasizes the influence of a unique "American" culture on U.S. foreign policy. See Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983).



investigate "culture" as a variable to explain the "security" behavior of states.<sup>4</sup> This is the central topic area of this thesis.

## **B. ORGANIZATION AND APPROACH**

The study is divided into two parts: in Part I, the objective is to look closely at the basic topic of acculturation. Chapter II examines what exactly this process is and how its influence can be extrapolated theoretically for its effect in the "output" of defense analysis and planning. The study shows that acculturation creates a culture-specific perspective and forms of behavior that adversely impact problem-solving and decision-making for defense. This affect is illustrated by examining culture and the fundamentals of socialization and the social-learning process. The study demonstrates that although culture and socialization perform essential functions for society, they can have concurrent, yet negative, impact by inhibiting effective cross-cultural interaction. The negative affects of culture are examined in a general manner, and then applied specifically to the task facing the security analyst and planner in Chapter III. This is accomplished by using several "strategic planning models" that have received widespread and influential use, and yet, do not specifically account for the influence of "cultural" variables.

Part II of the study concentrates on the expanded application of culture as a source of national "style" in international behavior. This area of international studies has received renewed attention and at least one new model has been proposed to account for "cultural/societal" influence on national behavior.<sup>5</sup> This model will be reviewed and

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<sup>4</sup>By far the most extensive effort in this regard has been accomplished by Colin Gray in *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). See also, Jack Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options*, RAND Report R-2154-AF, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September, 1977).

<sup>5</sup>The model used in this study is adapted from one presented as a "foreign policy behavior model" by Baard B. Knudsen in "The Paramount Value of Cultural Sources: Foreign Policy and Comparative Foreign

proposed as one method to approach the concepts of "strategic culture" and "national style" in strategy.

These two relatively new concepts have recently gained notoriety as yet another methodological approach to the study of national security affairs<sup>6</sup>. Proponents of these two constructs hope to show that they may be used to explain some types of specific security behavior in the international environment. Neither of these tools, however, either the model or the concept of strategic culture, is fully developed, but they do have great potential and therefore merit further study. This thesis hopes to contribute to this effort if only to enlighten readers to what has been accomplished and what remains to be done.

Chapter IV examines the concept of "strategic culture" and its potential utility. Several key works have recently addressed this concept and they are reviewed and critiqued as the primary source of data on a new methodological approach to explaining national security behavior. This study looks at the work accomplished to date in an effort to determine commonality of usage and definition of the concept. The findings are presented and applied, in Chapter V, to a proposed model of national security behavior.

Chapter V examines the derivative concept of "national style" in strategy. This concept speaks to the proposed affect of a state-specific strategic culture, which, like culture itself, is said to prescribe behavior among those who hold it in common. Because little work has been accomplished in this area of security studies, it is difficult to ascertain the full potential of this notion, but examples of the proposed affect on the strategic behavior of the United

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Policy Research Reconsidered," *Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics*, Vol. XXII, No. 2, (1987), pp. 81-113.

<sup>6</sup>Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., and Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., are the two most notable examples. See also Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," in *Comparative Strategy: An International Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 3, (1985), pp. 269-293. For a sharply critical appraisal of the genre, see Scott Sagan's review of Robert Dalleck's *American Style of Foreign Policy*, op. cit., in *Survival*, Vol. 25, No. 4, (July-August 1983), p. 192.

States and the Soviet Union are presented as case studies illustrating the utility of these concepts.

Finally, the findings and conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter VI, along with specific recommendations for further effort in this area of security studies. Hopefully, the reader will be satisfied at this point on the utility of both the fundamental and expanded application of the notion that culture does, in fact, influence the behavior not only of the individual, but of nations as well. Whether or not it can be used to predict when and how nations will act in specific circumstances is yet to be proved, but this thesis hopes to give "two cranks on the handle in the right direction."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Rear Admiral Hill's words in *Arms Control At Sea*, (Annapolis,MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 213.

## **II. CULTURE AND PERCEPTION**

The study begins with an examination of the origin and implication of one's perspective because this knowledge is of great value to the strategic planner and defense analyst. Additionally, this portion of the study forms the foundation for the next discussion on the advanced application of "cultural" analysis in defense studies. The ultimate objective of this thesis is to examine the concepts of "strategic culture" and "national style" in strategy, but that cannot be accomplished without a basic understanding of the concept of culture itself. This chapter examines that area in some detail.

### **A. THE ORIGINS OF PERSPECTIVE**

Anyone who has ever attempted to understand why humans act as they do has been puzzled at one time or another by behavior that simply appeared irrational. However, upon further evaluation, one may have concluded that, from the point of view of the subject, the behavior was in fact highly rational after all. This is one admittedly simplistic example of how perspective affects both behavior and analysis, and it serves as an appropriate point of departure for further discussion.

In the example presented, the analyst was subject to the bias of his own preconceptions of "rational" behavior, and inadvertently failed to account for the mitigating affects of "cultural" information not at his immediate, empirical disposal. Of course, such a crude example is easily criticized simply because it does not present all of the "facts" surrounding the event; but it is only meant to illustrate that, in some cases, misjudgment is simply due to an error of perspective. Consider the following observation by noted anthropologist Adda Bozeman, who, when critiquing some aspects of U.S. foreign policy,

concluded that one of the major problems confronting the international policy-maker in the United States is the "illusion of congruent values."

Mankind is not all of one kind; rather, it consists of a plurality of speech communities and civilizations. Each of these is sustained not so much by a particular political or economic arrangement as by its own sub-structure of paramount values. A culture's survival is a function of the basic ideas and persuasions that lend uniqueness to the culture complex in the first place and they are not comprised in times of internal or external stress.<sup>8</sup>

Bozeman points to a major source of confusion and misunderstanding in international relations which can have important consequences for the strategist. She succinctly illustrates how different societies have different value systems, thus setting the stage for major problems of cross-cultural interaction and analysis. But what is the source of these different "values?" The answer, of course, is culture itself. In fact, one of the most basic definitions of culture is the "values" of the group it serves.<sup>9</sup> However, this is far too simple an explanation for what is truly a complex problem for the security planner. Therefore, a closer look at culture itself is worth the effort at this point in the study.

## B. CULTURE AND SOCIAL VALUES

On a macro-scale, culture is one of the most significant determinants of boundary in the mass of humanity.<sup>10</sup> There are many others, of course, including race and language, but culture is one of the most fundamental. Territorial lines may bound a nation-state, but culture is a real differentiating element between peoples of the world. A discourse on the

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<sup>8</sup>Adda Bozeman, "American Policy and the Illusion of Congruent Values," *Strategic Review*, Vol. XV, No. 1, (Winter 1987), pp. 11-23.

<sup>9</sup>Culture is the "sum of morally forceful understandings acquired by learning and shared with members of the group to which the learner belongs." M. J. Schwartz and D. K. Jordan, *Culture: The Anthropological Perspective*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), p. 52.

<sup>10</sup>Edward T. Hall *Beyond Culture*, (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1977), p. 16.

international ramifications of this fact is unnecessary, but it leads one into a discussion of why culture exists in the first place: to bound and define unique groups of individuals who have come together for a collective purpose.

Culture has been described in terms of the artifacts of societies: Their art, language, and other products of human activity.<sup>11</sup> This is no longer entirely true; modern anthropologists now view culture not so much as what humans do as what they learn. For example, one recent textbook addresses culture in this way:

We will use "culture" to refer to the system of shared ideas, to the conceptual designs, the shared system of meanings, that underlie the ways people live. Culture, so defined, refers to what humans *learn*, not what they do or make. (emphasis original).<sup>12</sup>

This passage reflects a significant distinction between modern and classical anthropology that is important to the subject of this thesis. The distinction between the study of culture as the study of artifacts or the study of social learning is what leads to a greater utility of the concept itself: it effectively opens the field to other scholars who now recognize the subject of culture as being applicable to their own social science disciplines. Nevertheless, the basic study of culture remains the stock and trade of the anthropologist, although this too, may be changing.

Anthropologists, like their counterparts in other disciplines, have different "schools" of thought on just exactly what culture is or what it does for humanity, but they all seem to

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<sup>11</sup>For example, see the "classical" definition by Tyler (1871), quoted in L. A. White, *The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1969), p. 87.

<sup>12</sup>Roger M. Keesing, *Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), p. 87.

agree that culture is the intellectual underpinning of normal human behavior in groups.<sup>13</sup> In fact, culture can be said to only exist for relatively well-defined and stable groups.<sup>14</sup> There is no such thing as the "culture of the one," because, what culture fundamentally represents is the "rules" that tell individuals how to behave in the presence of others. Culture basically serves as a definition of the "norms" of human behavior, and by this definition, is recognizably unique to those it serves.<sup>15</sup>

Viewed in this manner, the concept of culture has applications at various levels of humanity, from small groups through nations. One could, using this criteria, even argue that all of humanity belongs to one culture. Although this may be so, it is not useful for the purposes here to belabor the issue further. What is important, however, is that culture *does* define groups. It does so by binding together several vital functions, necessary for the group's survival, into a framework which members of the group can learn.<sup>16</sup> In this regard, culture has both intra- and inter-group functions that, although necessary, can become a hindrance. At this juncture, and before proceeding to the details of the functions of culture, it seems appropriate to look closely at a definition of culture itself so one may see culture clearly as a phenomenon itself.

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<sup>13</sup>A useful summation of the varying schools of culture is provided by Roger M. Keesing, in "Theories of Culture," in Bernard J. Siegel, Alan R. Beals, and Stephen Tyler, eds., *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 1974, Vol. 3, (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1974), pp. 73-97.

<sup>14</sup>Goodenough asserts that "Cultural theory must explain in what sense we can speak of culture as being shared or as the property of groups." W. H. Goodenough, *Culture, Language and Society*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1971), p. 20, quoted in Keesing, "Theories of Culture," Siegel, *et. al.*, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>15</sup>Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture," in Frank W. Moore, eds., *Reading in Cross-Cultural Methodology*, (New Haven: HRAC Press, 1961), pp. 89-107.

<sup>16</sup>See for example, Keesing's discussion of "Cultures as Adaptive Systems," in "Theories of Culture," Siegel, *et. al.*, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, op. cit., p. 74.

### C. CULTURE DEFINED

During the course of the research for this study a number of definitions of culture were found. It is unnecessary to list them all, but suffice it to say that there were almost as many as there were studies that used culture as the prime topic of inquiry. In fact, one author, reporting on research of a similar application of this topic, lamented: "definitions of culture abound!"<sup>17</sup> He was certainly correct.

Most definitions have common themes, although they can be divided into "modern" and "classical" schools. The former tend to include mostly artifactual elements, and the latter seem to concentrate at the more fundamental level of normative values. The definition of culture used in this study represents the "modern" philosophy. To illustrate the diversity of definitions, the following common "normative" meanings are provided; they represent the full spectrum of modern definitions and impressions of culture. The concept is said to embody:

1. *Observed behavioral regularities* of individuals in a group.
2. The *norms* that evolve to guide behavior in a group.
3. The *dominant values* espoused by the group.
4. The *philosophy* that guides a group's behavior.
5. The *rules of the game* for surviving in the group.
6. The group *hierarchy of values*.
7. The *feeling, or climate*, that exists in a group.
8. The *beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of thought* employed by group members.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Knudsen, "The Paramount Value of Cultural Sources," in *Cooperation and Conflict*, op. cit., p. 107.

<sup>18</sup>Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), p. 6.; and Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit.; Keesing, *Cultural Anthropology*, op. cit.



The same author who compiled a majority of the above listing recognized that these examples do not capture the *essence* of culture. He argued persuasively that they are merely *reflections* of culture, and not culture itself. The author, Edgar Schein, provides the definition of culture that is used in this study. His was selected because, of all of the many considered, it is the most elegant and seems to capture the totality of the concept itself.<sup>19</sup>

Schein defines culture as:

a basic pattern of assumptions-- invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration-- that have worked well enough in the past to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.<sup>20</sup>

Culture, thus defined, "can be applied to any size social unit that has had the opportunity to learn and stabilize its view of itself and the environment around it."<sup>21</sup> Its influence exists at various levels of awareness to those it serves. Schein's definition illuminates the fact that culture is not merely the "values," or "beliefs," or "attitudes" that influence behavior: rather, it is the collection of "assumptions" that underpin the value-system itself.<sup>22</sup> These assumptions have been internalized by the members of the group

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<sup>19</sup>Schein's definition captures the "totality" of culture because his definition includes elements of the three principal "schools" of cultural theory: in this definition, culture is (1) an *adaptive system* that helps humans adjust to the environment; (2) and *ideational, or cognitive, system* that drives epistemology; and (3) it is a *socio-cultural system* that drives "the patterns of life of communities." See Keesing's "Theories of Culture," in Seigel, *et. al.*, eds., *Annual Review of Anthropology*, op. cit.

<sup>20</sup>Schein, *Organizational Culture*, *ibid*, p. 9.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid*, p. 8.

<sup>22</sup>"For culture consists not of actions, but of acquired tendencies to react, habits of mind and feeling, *assumptions which proceed belief and emotions which lie behind motions.*" (emphasis added) J. Martin, "American Culture: The Intersection of Past and Future," in J. G. Kirk, *America Now*, (New York: Athenum Press, 1968), p. 187, quoted in Knudsen, "The Paramount Importance of Cultural Sources," *Cooperation and Conflict*, op. cit., p. 90.

and they are, as Schein argues, "taken for granted," "invisible," and exist in the "preconscious." Figure II-1 illustrates this relationship.<sup>23</sup>




Figure II-1

When conceived of in this manner, one may see that culture itself, as a phenomenon representing a set of the most basic assumptions that individuals hold about themselves and the world around them, is, in fact, a prescription for the artifactual reflections of culture traditionally viewed as culture itself. As Schein notes, the definition of culture used herein, does not reflect any "overt behavior pattern" because:

<sup>23</sup>Schein, *Organizational Culture*, op. cit., p. 14.

overt behavior is always determined by both the cultural predispositions (the assumptions, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings that are patterned) and by the situational contingencies that arise from the external environment. Behavioral regularities could thus be as much a reflection of the environment as of the culture, and should, therefore, not be a prime basis for *defining* the culture. (emphasis original).<sup>24</sup>

In this statement, Schein implies that, while culture may guide behavior, it will not always explain it: "situational contingencies" may dominate causality, but culture will always dominate perception. This notion is critically important to the purpose of this thesis because it brings into sharp relief the most basic influence of culture and the justification for increased awareness of this affect. Strategic analysis, and decision-making for defense, is nothing more than a collection of judgements made about how to provide security for a nation. And, as one can see, culture significantly influences judgement:

Judgements are based upon experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation. Those who hold for the existence of fixed values will find materials in other societies that necessitate re-evaluation of their assumptions.<sup>25</sup>

With culture's influence on basic perception thus exposed, the effort now turns to examining why it exists, and to look closely at how, in satisfying its purpose, culture performs both positive and negative functions for the group it serves.

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<sup>24</sup>*Ibid*, p. 9.

<sup>25</sup>Melville J. Herskovits, *Cultural Relativism: Perspective in Cultural Pluralism*, (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 15.

#### D. CULTURE AND GROUP MAINTENANCE

Culture is a concept that is often used incorrectly to *describe* group maintenance functions when, in fact, it actually *supports* these sustenance functions. This section examines this common error and illustrates more closely the concept of culture itself. The "maintenance" functions addressed here are not performed by culture, but are rather the source and a reflection of culture.<sup>26</sup>

Culture can be said to exist only to serve a relatively well-defined group, and it does so by providing the intellectual assumptions that underpin judgement and behavior within the group.<sup>27</sup> Culture performs these functions as the group forms, becomes further defined, and as its members learn to deal collectively with their environment.

Culture supports group dynamics by providing guidelines for the "overt behavior" of both individuals and the group itself. But what behavior does culture specifically condition? and, why does it necessarily have this affect? A number of maintenance functions are necessary for group survival and are influenced by culture, but it is beyond the scope of this study to review them all in detail. Nevertheless, a brief review is beneficial because the typological examples presented are used for further development of the case that culture influences human behavior, and *ab extensio*, strategic planning and analysis.

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<sup>26</sup>Schein describes these functions in great detail in "The Functions of Culture in Organizations," *Organizational Culture*, op. cit., pp. 49-84.

<sup>27</sup>"well-defined" does not mean that groups should be viewed as *boundary-static*; groups expand and contract in size as they absorb and are absorbed by other other groups. See, for example, Snyder's discussion of "sub-groups" within the Soviet "strategic culture" in Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., pp. 10-13; see also, Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," in *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (Fall 1981), pp. 42-43.

The following two sections address the issue of culture and its purpose in support of group maintenance. Before proceeding, however, a few important remarks are in order: first, culture not only helps groups form and survive, it becomes synonymous with the particular group it serves; secondly, this portion of the study concentrates on how groups form, but one will note that in the process, culture itself forms; thirdly, this section is based upon an "organizational" approach to culture.<sup>28</sup> The organizational approach is not significantly different in effect than the more traditional, or societal, approach taken by the anthropologist. It is, however, less complex, but very useful to the purpose of this study. In a theoretical sense, then, the organizational approach to culture may be seen as applicable to "groups" or "organizations" of all sizes: the culture of a tribe, an organization, or a nation may be described in this manner.

#### **1. Culture's Maintenance Functions**

Culture supports two types of group maintenance functions: one internal and the other external. Although functionally separate, they are highly interdependent, and have a mutually reinforcing affect on each other. Most important, they contribute to the overall mission of the group's survival. Culture only exists to serve groups, and as groups form, the culture develops. Why groups form is a topic unto itself, but culture ultimately comes to reflect the group's reason for being in the first place: the group's "mission" is, so to speak, one artifactual paradigm of the culture.

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<sup>28</sup>This methodology derives primarily from Schein's effort in *Organizational Culture*, op. cit. However, Graham Allison's work on the "conceptual models" of U.S. foreign and military policies appears to support use of this framework. His "Organizational Process Model" has some of the characteristics of Schein's approach and seems to acknowledge the "cultural" impact of group behavior. See Graham T. Allison, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Case Study of Crisis Decision-making," in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Strum, eds., *American Defense Policy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), especially pp. 583-601.

When groups form, no matter the reason, they do so of choice and with a purpose in mind.<sup>29</sup> Once formed, they must maintain and survive to support the original purpose or mission. To survive, the group must (1) bring in and indoctrinate new members, and (2) remain defined and cohesive. At the same time, the group must learn to deal with stimulants in the external environment that (1) may impede the mission of the group, or (2) threaten the group itself.

*a. Internal Maintenance*

Survival of the group is one "internal integration function" that culture serves. Group cohesion is another. To survive as a group, the membership must solve a number of issues that relate to the group's internal organization and operation. The following list of internal "problems" is representative. One may say that, as a minimum, a group's needs involve:

1. A common language and "conceptual categories."
2. "Boundaries," and rules for inclusion/exclusion.
3. A system that prescribes "peer relationships."
4. A means of meeting out reward and punishment.
5. An ideology, or "religion," to guide the group.<sup>30</sup>

Resolution of these and a number of other similar issues allow the group to survive, maintain, and grow. However, one can see that the solutions are fundamentally

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<sup>29</sup>One could certainly argue that all groups do not "form of choice." Slaves, convicts in a prison, or others forced together under similar circumstances and against their will certainly fit into this category. Nevertheless, they will, of choice and necessity once together, form a group, and come to develop a group-specific culture according to the model presented herein.

<sup>30</sup>Adapted from Schein's examples of "internal maintenance functions," in *Organizational Culture*, op. cit., pp. 65-82. See also Morton Halperin's discussion of the "shared images" and bureaucratic politics in, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974), pp. 150 ff; and Allison, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in Reichart, et. al., *American Foreign Policy*, op. cit.

subjective: they are "right" and "correct" to the group they serve. It does not matter whether the solutions are forced upon the group (by a dictator, "boss," or tribal chief) or whether they are arrived at by mutual consent. The arbiter is irrelevant; the motivation is not.

Ultimately, such solutions become the property of the group. They may, in time, achieve status as culture, or "cultural artifacts" of the group. They may even become "assumptions," and form the fundamental linkage between culture and behavior. This linkage is further strengthened when one recalls the hierarchy of culture: "*assumptions*" underpin "*values*," which in turn prescribe "*artifacts*," or the products of "overt behavior."<sup>31</sup> Therefore, as solutions to internal integration problems become assumptions, and exist primarily at the level of the preconscious, they begin to affect how people think, solve problems, and act.

*b. External Maintenance*

Culture would not be nearly as interesting or important a topic for study if all group values systems were the same or even very similar. They are not, and this fact is of paramount importance to the purpose of this study. As an example, many group missions are in conflict with each other, and inter-group competition and rivalry is almost always unavoidable in an anarchistic external environment. The implications for "order" between groups hardly needs illustration or deliberation.<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, each group's unique culture helps it to maintain itself in this hostile external environment.

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<sup>31</sup>Schein's description of "The Levels and Content of Culture and Their Interaction," in *Ibid*, . see especially Figure 1, p. 14, and accompanying text, pp. 14-21.

<sup>32</sup>The example of "colliding survival missions" of nations in the international community may be tested in the very near future as such truly "universal" concerns as the global environment come more to the forefront of concern. This example may be one of the first "adaptation issues" that confronts the "group" of humanity.

Groups form for a purpose, and once they are constituted and organized internally, then they must be equipped to accomplish whatever it was that caused them to form initially. For the purpose of this study it matters little why groups form. Likewise, how it chooses to define its mission is unimportant. One should recognize that, depending upon how the group is organized internally, the "core mission," or "primary task" may be determined by direction or consensus. The group only need know what it is to accomplish and how it is expected to accomplish it.

One way of looking at group survival in the external environment is in terms familiar to the defense analyst: survival becomes a matter of strategy. As a minimum, a group needs to resolve the following issues if it is to survive in an environment that is beyond the complete control of its members. The group requires:

1. A stated *mission*.
2. A *strategy* to achieve the mission.
3. *Goals* to judge progress.
4. A system to judge accomplishment of the goals.
5. A feed-back mechanism.
6. A correction plan to adjust progress.<sup>33</sup>

The issue of survival in the external environment then becomes a function of the group's "strategy," which, one can easily see, is fundamentally a function of "judgement." Problem definition and analysis (the environment), solutions to the problem(s) (the goals and strategy), and a scheme to adjust the two as a result of changes in

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<sup>33</sup>Adapted from Schien's "external adaptation issues," in *Organizational Culture*, op. cit., pp. 52-64; see also Albert Clarkson, *Toward Effective Strategic Analysis: New Applications of Information Technology*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), especially Chapter 2, "Strategic Analysis Model," pp. 7-21; Clarkson's "model," although not designed as a "organizational-survival" model, speaks to the process of strategic planning for nations as Schein does for organizations. Both view the "process" in much the same way.



either (a feed-back and correction scheme) are all subject to the perspective of the particular group who conceptualizes them. Again, it does not matter who makes the decisions about how to cope with the external problems; it simply matters that the decisions are made for the group. They become group property, and ultimately, a part of the group's culture.

## **E. SUMMARY**

This chapter addressed several key issues that are essential to further development of the theme that culture affects how nations act, and to build the case that this notion may be approached methodically and used predictively. In this regard, it may be useful here to re-focus on the intended points of the chapter so as to ensure the proper groundwork for succeeding chapters.

First, culture is the product of a group, no matter the size or purpose of the group. Functionally, culture serves to help the group form, maintain itself, and survive in the environment. An individual, as a member of the group, learns the rules associated with the group, and the sub-groups (if any) to which he belongs. He is taught how to approach problems and how to behave, and this socialization process has the added effect of teaching the individual how to think. Culture, in fact, prescribes his cognitive and perceptual framework.

Next, a group becomes defined by its culture, and, this may be seen as cumulative for parent and sub-groups. It is important, for example, to view societies (and nations as physically bounded societies) as one large group consisting of many sub-groups. The concept of culture applies, at the macro-level, to the society as a whole, and, at the micro-level, to the sub-groups within the society. But, conceptually, the two must have a commonality of basic assumptions. A sub-group, for example, cannot build its value system in a vacuum; it must share assumptions with the host society's culture.

### III. CULTURE AND STRATEGY

A case has been made for the linkage between culture and perception. The logic is relatively simple and the implications for basic problem-solving and decision-making inspire little argument. In general, culture's affect is positive: it provides individuals with the guidelines necessary to function in the social environment. It also serves the larger purpose of helping the group that the individual belongs to survive. Culture has a cohesive affect for the group: it binds and it defines.

Concurrently, culture can have a negative impact for the group when it is forced to interact with other "foreign" groups; this is especially evident if the basic value-systems and missions of the groups collide. When this occurs, the group is confronted with a basic survival issue: its prosperity or defense becomes an issue. One way of approaching group survival in the external environment was presented briefly in the previous chapter: the group needs a strategy for its survival and prosperity.

A group (or society), if organized for a specific mission, will approach external survival at least conceptually in this manner. Of course, all groups may not consciously view the problem in quite the same "structured" format as presented herein, but they logically should see the problems of survival and prosperity in terms of "missions," "goals," and "plans of action." If not, one could easily argue that it is a result of the group's underdeveloped culture in the first place.

Strategic planning, and culture's affect on that process, is the central topic of this chapter. The following sections examine several methodological approaches to the discipline of strategy and provide models to illustrate the process. At the same time, the

negative affects of the strategist's own perception of the problem itself, and how he arrives at his solutions, are further illuminated.

This chapter seeks two objectives: first, it seeks to bridge the two major themes of this study through an examination of the topic of strategy itself. Chapter II illuminates the basic influence of culture on perception, and this chapter looks closely at how this can be usefully applied to the process of strategic analysis and planning. Second, the chapter lays the foundation for succeeding chapters that seek to examine the concepts of strategic culture and national style in strategy. To support this effort, this chapter looks specifically at the outputs of strategic planning processes. This serves to illustrate how the ideas of strategic culture and national style may be applied and tested in subsequent chapters.

The first part of the chapter examines strategy in general, but the effort is not exhaustive.<sup>34</sup> It is not an in-depth investigation of the subject, but rather, an undertaking to provide a basic conceptual model which can be used to illustrate the potential impact of culture on the "process" of strategic planning.

#### **A. STRATEGY AS A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS**

Strategy has been described in the previous chapter as a problem of group "external adaptation" to the environment. As such, strategic planning represents one of the most fundamental problem-solving issues confronting a group, no matter the size of the group or its mission. This section takes the approach that strategy, as a basic problem-solving issue, confronts all relatively well-defined and internally structured groups that have a reason for being and surviving as a separate entity in the external environment. When viewed as

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<sup>34</sup>This section deals very little with the large body of literature on "traditional" military strategy. That subject is addressed in somewhat more detail in the following chapter; what is addressed here may be called the "strategy for programming," or "developmental" strategy.

such, strategy becomes *a process*, a way to a solution of a problem. The problem, as defined in this section, is the group's survival.

However, having said this, one can easily recognize that the intent of a specific strategy is a function of the "primary task" or mission that caused the group's formation. Survival is fundamental to all groups, but it is important to appreciate that just how "survival" is defined determines the intent of a particular strategy. Because of this, the term "strategy" means many things to different people, depending upon the group they associate the word with. Strategy has long been affiliated with the military plans of nations, but recently, the term has been used to describe a process appropriate to any number of applications. One frequently sees a variety of modifiers associated with the term: "political," "economic," and "marketing" strategies are examples of these applications. Author J. C. Wylie, when writing on military strategy, noted that "strategy is a loose sort of word," and unless specifically associated with a "goal," its meaning is highly ambiguous.<sup>35</sup> Wylie is correct, but for the purposes here, the goals of a particular strategy is irrelevant. The following sections address "generic" strategy as an example of a process.

### **1. Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means**

In the most basic terms, strategy may be viewed as a problem-solving process which is intrinsically linked to how the group perceives and defines itself and the environment. The group needs to know where it is going---the ends, how it plans to get there--- the ways, and what is necessary in terms of "instruments," or "tools," to support the plan--- the means.<sup>36</sup> This most simple approach to strategy illustrates the fundamental

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<sup>35</sup>J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, Classics of Sea Power Series Re-print, (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 19890, p. 14.

<sup>36</sup>This "model" was taken from Arthur F. Lykkes, Jr., "Defining Military Strategy," *Military Review*, Vol. LXIX, No. 5, (May 1989), p. 2; Wylie's "equation" is similar in *Ibid*.

issues that must be resolved by the group in order to ensure its survival or prosperity in the environment. However, there are deficiencies in this conceptual approach because it fails to give the necessary emphasis to two primary considerations for survival or prosperity: it does not differentiate "opportunities" or "threats" in the environment. These two elements are inherently included in the equation, yes, but they are not defined as separate elements.

## **2. Strategy and the External Environment**

Strategy approached as a "ways and means" issue is conceptually incomplete for the purposes here. It concentrates on the essential elements, but this approach fails to give proper emphasis to the countervailing consequences of the environment. Of course, this deficiency can be discounted by the argument that the environment served as the motive force for strategy in the first place, and this is correct. However, strategy as presented herein, is a problem-solving process, and any conceptual design that more completely outlines the elements of the "problem" is more efficient and will obviously give one better products.

The requirement for a strategy, like culture, is a function of the environment.<sup>37</sup> The group, by definition, has a mission, a reason for being. As such, there is a goal: something that the groups collectively desires. This may be (as in the case of a nation) repelling hostile groups, it may be (as in the case of a business) obtaining a larger portion of the "market share," or it may be simply concluding a successful campaign for political office (as in the case of a political candidate or his party). But, in every case, the fact that others in the environment, other nations, other businesses or political opponents, seek

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<sup>37</sup>According to Schein: "One must never forget that the environment initially determines the possibilities, options, and constraints for a group, and thus forces the group to specify its primary task or function if it is to survive at all. The environment thus initially influences the formation of culture, but once the culture is present in the sense of shared assumptions, those assumptions, in turn, influence what will be perceived and defined as the environment." *Organizational Culture*, op. cit., p. 51.

similar goals causes one to view the environment as an "impediment." Strategy exists as a function of the competitive social environment, and without competition, there would be no need for strategy: the group would only need determine what it desires, and take it.

Because the environment is an impediment, it is something that requires careful and structured analysis. What in the environment specifically hinders acquisition of the group's goals? Who are the competitors and what are their capabilities? Are there sympathetic elements or allies in the environment to assist the group in its endeavor? The list is endless, but depending upon the group and its goals and mission, this list may be tailored to the particular needs of a unique group. The essential point to realize is that the group must view the environment as an element intrinsically linked to its approach to the process of strategic planning.

### **3. Basic Strategic Planning Models**

One useful methodology to apply to the basic strategic planning process has been provided by authors William Ascher and William Overholt.<sup>38</sup> Their "strategic planning model" broadly illustrates the process: to achieve the "mission" (regardless of what that mission might be), the group defines the goals, or "*interest*," that it seeks to fulfill. They analyze the *environment*, and devise a *strategy* that will succeed in the forecast environment while concurrently achieving the desired goals. See Figure III-1.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>William Ascher and William H. Overholt, *Strategic Planning and Forecasting*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), pp. 21-40.

<sup>39</sup>All figures this section are adapted from Ascher & Overholt, *Strategic Planning and Forecasting*.

### Basic Strategic Planning Model



Figure III-1

However, although the process appears simple, the authors recognize the uncertainties inherent in forecasting the future. Therefore, they recommend projecting several different, yet separate, potential future environments. Using this methodology, a unique strategy could then be formulated to achieve specific goals in each of the separate environments. See Figure III-2.




Figure III-2

This may well be an effective method to solve for incertitude in the future, but it is not the most efficient. For example, having, say, three separate environments would necessitate three coincidental strategies. However, the "tools" to operationalize one strategy in a specific environment may be inefficient or ineffective for another. Thus, the tools to achieve strategy #1 in environment #1 may not be suitable or as efficient if events force their use in environment #2. The authors of this model recognize also that if the projected environment(s) fail to evolve as forecast, then a strategy selected for that environment may be inappropriate when put to the test of unforeseen circumstances. The

task of revising a strategy "on the fly" may be too difficult, or even impossible, thereby necessitating a "crisis" response.

The proposed solution to these problems is elegant in its simplicity. Ascher and Overholt recommend determining a variety of future environments and then aggregating the results into a common "core" environment. This core environment represents similar elements of a variety of possible futures that have the highest probability of occurring as forecast. Other less assured elements forming dissimilar yet potential contingencies are so differentiated. Of these, the strategist selects a "preferred" environment and tailors the planning effort toward this contingency. See Figure III-3.

### Complex Strategic Planning Model




Figure III-3

This "complex" planning model allows the group to tailor its strategies to a wide variety of possible contingencies and environments. A "core" strategy, operable in the core environment, forms the basis of the groups planning efforts. The "preferred" environment then informs a "basic" strategy." A "hedging strategy" is designed to account for "exogenous contingencies" that, although unlikely to occur, do have potential to evolve.



The Ascher/Overholt model is a "developmental" model of strategic planning. It is optimized for long-range planning and provides a very efficient method of planning for future environments.<sup>40</sup> The model works best in the planning environment where the strategist is unconstrained by either prescribed, or "by direction" goals, or limited to using "in-hand" tools. The planner therefore is able to determine both the goals he seeks to achieve and the strategy necessary to accomplish the goals. This model assumes that goals and interests are determined as an integral part of the planning process, and that the tools necessary to implement the strategy will be forthcoming following selection of the appropriate "plan."

In this regard, the Ascher/Overholt model is quite different from "operational planning" models which, like the major portion of military strategy, may depend upon either existing tools or directed goals. This does not mean that the Ascher/Overholt model will not work for operational strategy, for certainly it will. It is just not optimized for this type of effort. This "complex" model is best applied to "grand" or "national strategy," but it may be used here to show the influence that perspective has on the generic process of strategic planning itself.<sup>41</sup>

Military strategy is no different, in theory, from the type of strategic planning effort described by the "complex" model presented above. In reality, however, the "two levels" of military strategy--- long-range or "developmental" and short-range or

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<sup>40</sup>This description of strategic planning models has been associated with military strategy by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Arthur F. Lykkes, Jr., eds., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U. S. Army War College, 1989), p. 4.

<sup>41</sup>See use of the Ascher/Overholt model in Paul Bracken, "*Strategic Planning for National Security: Lessons from the Business Experience*," A RAND NOTE, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, February 1990).

"operational"--- are brought into sharp relief in national military planning.<sup>42</sup> Some have even gone so far as to divide military strategy into two types: "wartime" and "peacetime" planning. The former, of course, is short range and represents what one traditionally recognizes as specific war plans; the latter, however, cannot be so easily described except to say that it is long-range. One author concluded that such peacetime planning is really nothing more than basically "a choice among weapons systems."<sup>43</sup> This may be true, and the implications of this statement deserve and will receive more treatment in the following chapter. But at this point it is only necessary to recognize that the "complex" model used in this section is meant to serve as a vehicle to explore the implications of perspective on the problem-solving process of strategic planning.

### C. CULTURAL VALUES AND STRATEGY

The complex strategic planning model used in the previous section describes one efficient method of resolving the task of strategy formulation for group survival and prosperity in the external environment. The process is conceptually simple: define the goals that support interests, evaluate the environment, and devise a strategy. However, each task is subjective and susceptible to the cultural bias of the group's basic assumptions and value-system. Consider, for example, the task of determining "interests," which in turn prescribes the "goals." By definition, interests are a function of what is important to the group in terms not only of its basic mission, but also what is "valued" by the group's basic assumptions. In the most fundamental sense, then, interests are a product of cultural determinants. Likewise, the planning model demonstrates that the group must analyze the environment and determine threats, opportunities, allies, adversaries, and the like. One

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<sup>42</sup>Lykke, "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy*, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>43</sup>Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, (Princeton:The Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 361.

can easily see how each of these decisions can be influenced by both the culture of the group itself and by how the group has defined its interests.

Even after the group's analysts have concluded the forecast of potential future environments, one environment must be selected as the "preferred" alternative. This too, is by definition, a subjective call on the part of the group concerned. In the final analysis, strategy is a quintessentially subjective endeavor that is highly dependent upon what is valued by the group it serves.

However, one should recall that a strategy is an artifact of the group's culture; it is created. As such, it may be classified as an "overt behavior" patterned by the group's assumptions. Schein cautioned that causality of overt behavior is a function both of the prescription of the group's culture and the "situational contingencies" in the environment that can influence behavior.<sup>44</sup> In this regard, one cannot dispute the fact that strategy is operationalized in an environment that is in flux; the environment is understandably dynamic, and one of the most important "situational contingencies" of the environment may be nothing more than the countervailing strategy of an opponent. This "action-reaction" phenomenon presents the strategist with a dilemma: he is presented with a requirement not only to devise his own plans and strategy, but he must also be able to appreciate how the adversary perceives the problem for his group. To accomplish this, the strategist, in his role as an analyst, must be able to empathize with his adversary: he must be capable of seeing the strategic planning process from another's point of view. The question is, how can this be accomplished if judgement is predisposed by cultural bias?

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<sup>44</sup>Schein, *Organizational Culture*, op. cit., p. 9.

## 1. Ethnocentrism

The condition of being unable to empathize with another is the result of one's culture. As demonstrated herein, culture calibrates one's perspective during the socialization process. As the individual "learns" how to act and think as a member of the group, he internalizes the basic assumptions of the group which, in turn, become the basis for both his and the group's value-system. The consequence that this has for one's perceptual judgement is termed "ethnocentrism." It is the "perceptual lens" through which one views the world.<sup>45</sup> One author describes this condition as "the point of view that one's own way of life is preferred to all others."<sup>46</sup> Another's description points more to the impact that "ethnocentrism" has for the strategist. It inhibits objective judgement:

Ethnocentrism is the view of things in which one's own group is at the center of everything, and all others are *scaled* and *referenced to it*. (emphasis added).<sup>47</sup>

One can see that ethnocentrism can make evaluation of the activities of other groups difficult. Such judgements are likely to be colored by the preconceived conclusions driven by the observer's cultural assumptions. The result is often a misleading evaluation, a distorted picture of what the other group may actually be doing, and is caused by the "projection of one's own frame of reference onto others."<sup>48</sup> This perceptual deficiency is also described as "mirror-imaging" the values of one's own culture onto another. This, in turn, severely hampers the analysts' ability to make unbiased judgements about those not in his group. According to Bonfrenbrenner,

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<sup>45</sup>Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., p. v.

<sup>46</sup>Herskovits, *Cultural Relativism*, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>47</sup>Sumner, *Folkways*, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>48</sup>Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, (New York: Holmes & Meier, Inc., 1979), p. 15.

Mirror-imaging is a tendency to assimilate new perceptions into old and unconsciously distort what one sees in such a way as to minimize a clash with previous expectations.<sup>49</sup>

The term ethnocentrism, then, describes the most basic influence that one's culture and value-system has on the individual's ability to make objective judgements in cross-cultural analysis. It is a universal socio-psychological phenomenon, and the impact on strategic analysis and planning should be obvious. The defense policy of any state is, for example, closely tied to that state's understanding of the international environment and its place in that environment. To conduct effective and efficient planning to achieve its goals, the group's analysts and planners must be able to account for the influence of their own ethnocentrically biased judgement. And, as one author concluded, "strategy is a particularly ethnocentric business."<sup>50</sup>

Some argue that it is impossible to entirely negate the effect of one's culture on analysis and judgement, and this is probably true to a certain degree.<sup>51</sup> For example, one can argue that it is only possible to make judgements based upon one's own "frame of reference." And, as a result, one could persuasively argue that it is impossible to truly see the world through the eyes of one from another culture. If so, what is the solution for those who must engage in cross-cultural analysis?

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<sup>49</sup>Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror-Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," *Journal Of Social Issues*, Vol. 17, (1961), pp. 45-56.

<sup>50</sup>Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>51</sup>Herskovits, in *Cultural Relativism*, argued: "There is literally no moment in the life of an individual when the influence of culture is not felt," p. 76; see also: Donald T. Campbell, "Introduction: Herskovitz, Cultural Relativism, and Metascience," in *Ibid*, p. xiv, where he argues that "ethnocentric bias would never be completely removed."

## 2. Cultural Relativism

Recognition of ethnocentrism as a cultural phenomenon is certainly not new. Anthropologists have wrestled with the implications of a culture-specific perspective for their own objective analysis for many years.<sup>52</sup> A number of methodologies have been developed to help the anthropologist account for this problem, and the results of this effort may be useful to the strategist.<sup>53</sup>

The issue, of course, is how to conduct effective cross-cultural analysis when the cognitive facilities of the observer are biased by his own experience, culture, and point of view. As described, the problem would appear insurmountable. In fact, it can be argued that how one approaches the problem of analysis itself is a function of culture, and, as a result, the conclusions drawn are always suspect.<sup>54</sup> However, even though there would appear to be no infallible solution, an effort must be made to counter cultural prejudice in judgement. The question is how, in the absence of an absolute or universal "frame of reference," can such a perspective be achieved? Is there an "opposite tendency" to ethnocentrism?<sup>55</sup>

The optimistic answer is in the affirmative: strive for an "objective" perspective by becoming a cultural "relativist." To accomplish this, one must search for the source of

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<sup>52</sup>Frank W. Moores, eds., *Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology*, op. cit., *passim*.

<sup>53</sup>See especially the approach outlined in Oscar Lewis, "Comparisons in Cultural Anthropology," in *Ibid*, p. 50-57.

<sup>54</sup>This argument is based upon (1) Schein's assertion that a strategy for external adaptation is an artifact of culture, and (2) Herskovits' assertion on the permanency of ethnocentrism. Strategy, as a process that requires analysis, cannot be free of cultural bias in the first place. This affect can only be mitigated by effort.

<sup>55</sup>Booth's description of "cultural relativism" as "the opposite tendency of ethnocentrism," in *Strategic and Ethnocentrism*, op. cit., p. 15.

bias in one's own and other's frames of reference. The analyst must build toward the ability to empathize with other cultures. "Cultural relativism" is the solution recognized by anthropologists. It is a philosophical, methodological, and practical approach to cross-cultural analysis.<sup>56</sup> The cultural relativist recognizes that epistemology derives from the force of acculturation, and he seeks to apply this knowledge to assist in his analysis. At least one noted anthropologist has written extensively on this subject, and concluded that:

Cultural relativism... recognizes the values set up by every society [or group] to guide its own life and understand their worth to those who live by them, though they may differ from their own... The relativistic point of view brings into sharp relief the validity of every set of norms for the people who have them, and the values that they represent.<sup>57</sup>

The author, Melville Herskovits, would deny that striving for a culturally relative perspective can, as others have argued, create a truly "objective" point of view. He admits, however, that in attempting to achieve this condition, one can become aware of the hazards of ethnocentrism.<sup>58</sup> One defense commentator succinctly observes the value of cultural relativism as:

the view that no culture is superior and that cultural diversity should be tolerated, understood and appreciated, rather than ethnocentrically condemned. Cultures should be judged in their own terms, rather than in terms of the values and norms of the person who is observing that culture from the outside.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup>Herskovits' claim in *Cultural Relativism*, op. cit., pp. 31-33.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid*, p. 31.

<sup>58</sup>David Bindley, in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Science*, (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), p. 543, described "cultural relativism" as a "state of detachment" from the observed culture that would allow the observer to achieve "objective" analysis and perspective.

<sup>59</sup>Colonel James B. Motley, US Army, (Ret.), "U.S. Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy," *Military Review*, (January 1990), p. 4.

#### D. SUMMARY

This chapter has demonstrated the influence of a culture-specific perspective on a basic strategic planning model, and how judgement, colored by ethnocentrism, can directly impact the outputs of the process. It has also reviewed the recommended anthropological solution to ineffective cross-cultural analysis: cultural relativity, which, one can argue, is a justification for studying this subject and the strategic culture of adversaries.

The chapter has also presented a planning model, and reviewed the cultural influence on this type of structured approach to strategy. The model used for this purpose was selected for two reasons: (1) because it could demonstrate the problem-solving nature of fundamental strategy, and (2) because it is a 'developmental' planning model and is the most appropriate type for use in the next two chapters.

The first two chapters of this study presented the problems of cultural bias in strategy formulation. One will note that the problem is reciprocal: ethnocentrism works both ways; it influences all parties involved. Logically, one would assume that, given an understanding of this biased condition, one need only select an application (such as strategy) and conduct further analysis to ascertain specifically the source and influence of culture on a case-by-case basis. This is exactly the argument put forth by those who engage in "cultural and stylistic" methods of security analysis.<sup>60</sup> They seek to explain apparent "misjudgment" in defense planning in cultural terms, and have recommended a new variable for use in the strategic planning equation. The variable is called "strategic culture" and the effort of this study now turns to this topic.

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<sup>60</sup>Gray's phrase in *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit.



#### IV. STRATEGIC CULTURE

The emphasis of Part I of this thesis has been on acculturation and the fundamental influence that culture exerts on cognitive capabilities. The reader should be able to see the linkage between culture and perception, and of the implication that this knowledge holds for effective problem-solving and decision-making in strategic planning. This knowledge itself has important consequences for the strategist because it allows him to see the source of his own epistemology; it also exposes the fact that his derives from a different source than that of his opponent. Illuminating this concern has been one objective of this study, but it also serves as the intellectual foundation of Part II where the concepts of "strategic culture" and its derivative, "national style" in strategy, are examined.

This study has reviewed the fundamentals of culture: its source, purpose and influence on cognition and behavior. An *organizational* approach has been used that looks at culture as a social-learning tool in support of group development and maintenance. Strategy was also examined and, in this regard, it was demonstrated to be a *process* that groups employ to adapt and survive vis-a-vis the external environment. Finally, the process of strategy itself was reviewed to expose the significant influence that the group's culture has on that process itself. These points serve to underpin the next two chapters of the study and are the basis for the theory that each nation develops a unique "strategic culture," that is said to influence national security behavior in the international environment.

According to this theory, strategic culture serves as a value-system that provides the assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes that members of the group hold about the use of force as an instrument of policy in international relations. As a result, the strategic culture guides and circumscribes specific facets of a nation's security behavior. In particular, a nation's

security policies and military strategies (the "outputs") are believed to be a function of the strategic culture.<sup>61</sup> The concept holds that, just as culture conditions individual behavior in groups and societies, so strategic culture conditions the security behavior of nations within the international community. Moreover, it produces predictable and recognizable national "styles" in strategic problem-solving. This chapter examines the concept of strategic culture and looks at a methodology to analyze the subject.

#### A. STRATEGIC CULTURE: PURPOSE AND USAGE

Strategic culture is a concept based on the understanding of culture as the intellectual underpinning of behavior. The assertion that a culture and its value-system affect cognition and behavior was addressed in detail in Part I of this study. And, although one may accept the underlying linkage between culture, perception, and "overt behavior," it is not intuitively obvious that this relationship holds equally firm at the individual and national levels. The linkage between the two is analogous, yes, but it is less direct and therefore less compelling. Nevertheless, an effort has been made in this area to explain the security behavior of nations and this seems to be the basic usage of the concept of "strategic culture."

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<sup>61</sup> Proponents of the "strategic culture" construct will be the first to argue that the concept does not argue in favor of mono-causality: the "strategic culture" may guide attitudes and belief, but, as Schein noted, "situational contingencies" in the environment may influence specific behavior in a given situation. Schein *Organizational Culture*, op. cit., p. 9; Gray, in *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., has stated that "one is discerning tendencies, not determinants." p. 35; Snyder, in *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., p. 38, cautions: "The notion of strategic culture, strategic doctrine, and crisis style does not posit a rigid code of behavior. Rather, they suggest that the evaluation of the rationality of alternative course of action in specific situations will, reflect in part, stylistic and cultural predispositions."

To proponents, strategic culture represents another variable in strategic studies and, as such, it appears to have two fundamental applications.<sup>62</sup> First, it appears that the concept is used by security analysts to *describe* the influence that culture has on a nation's security behavior in the international environment. Secondly, it appears to be used as an *analytical tool* to understand how the construct impacts national security behavior.

As a descriptive construct, strategic culture is used to illuminate the influence of culture on a wide variety of activities related to how a nation uses, and thinks about using, its armed forces. However, because the construct is neither fully developed or widely accepted (both because of "methodological" inadequacies), it is difficult to outline precisely when and how to use it. Only a few authors have so far even used the term in their writings, and they have described cultural influence across the full range of modern defense topics from nuclear strategy to entire defense programs, policies and behavior. In addition, there are others who, while not specifically mentioning "strategic culture" *per se*, have cited, for example, the U.S. "way of war" as a result of cultural and historical experiences.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>One could argue that "culture" as a "variable" for determining the external behavior patterns of nations is not new. As previously noted, this is, however, a new area in "security" studies. The security behavior of a nation is recognized as one component of its "foreign policy," and in this regard, "cultural influence" has been examined previously. For example, in what seems to be one highly regarded text on the subject of foreign policy, James Rosenau aggregates culture in one of the "five principal variables" for determining international behavior of nations. Rosenau includes "culture" under "those non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its external behavior" in his "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," from *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 95-149. The "five variable clusters" are listed on p. 108-109. In a more recent text on the same subject, K. J. Holsti, acknowledges that "military behavior" is an "output" of foreign policy, and that it is influenced by *attitudes* that cause *orientation* in *national roles*. See chapter 4, "Foreign-Policy Orientations and National Roles," in *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 92-115.

<sup>63</sup>Russell F Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Policy and Strategy*, (Bloomington: The Indiana University Press, 1977) is representative of this genre.

As an analytical tool the concept is even less developed and therein lies the reasoning behind much of the principal criticism. The studies mentioned above examine historical events and conclude that culture affects strategic behavior, however, but does so without support of a testable model; a cause -and- effect relationship between a strategic culture and specific behavior is argued, but, many would say, not proven.

Therefore, neither application is fully developed in the existing literature; its usage varies from case to case and author to author. This inconsistency seems to stem from the fact that although proponents accept that a strategic cultures exists, and that they condition some aspects of security behavior, their specific contents have yet to be agreed upon. For example, in two of the most representative pieces of literature on this topic, neither author develops a theoretical framework of the *variable* strategic culture in any detail. Both declare its existence with a general definition as it pertains to their particular study and then proceed to outline the effects that it has on the specific nations under examination.<sup>64</sup> As a result, critics question the conclusions based upon a "strategic culture" theory. One naysayer (although not specifically addressing either of the works cited above) launched a broadside at the entire genre when he concluded that:

This points to the dangers in many efforts to explain foreign policy or military strategy through focus on "national style," "psychological processes," or "strategic culture": such explanations tend to debase the political debate. They can easily degenerate into *ad hominem* arguments; one does not have to demonstrate that any particular policy was wrong, only that it stemmed from "irrational causes," "misperceptions," or "cultural biases."<sup>65</sup>

This criticism is not entirely invalid because proponents *do* seem to concentrate on the artifacts of a strategic culture, but, unfortunately, do not provide sufficient front-end

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<sup>64</sup>Gray's *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., and Snyder's *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit.

<sup>65</sup>Scott Sagan's review of Robert Dalleck's *American Style of Foreign Policy*, in *Survival*, op. cit., p. 192.

analysis of the concept itself to help support their conclusions. They may, as in the case of Colin Gray's *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, expend great effort describing the effect of the strategic culture itself, but they do not support this effort with a *model* of how this culture came to be or by demonstrating the basic linkages between cultural theory and strategic application. The literature is dominated by what strategic culture *does*: how it effects perception, how it can influence strategy formulation, and how it produces stylized behavior, but rarely is any detail provided on the intellectual foundations of these conclusions. This leaves those who employ the concept open to the criticism of using faulty and unproven methodology which, in turn, calls into question the conclusions obtained. Ken Booth, a "founding father" in this area of defense analysis (his *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* is one of the most frequently cited texts on culture's influence on strategic thinking), cautions against the "myth" of a "Strategic Man" driven to predictability by cultural determinants. He is an outspoken critic of those who refuse to admit that culture affects perception, but he is concerned that the construct of strategic culture takes the notion too far. "Society," argues Booth, "explains everything, and therefore it explains nothing."<sup>66</sup> Causality linkage is certainly a contentious issue. Booth's caution is acknowledged, but the evidence that culture, by definition, influences behavior is too strong to ignore. The question remains, however, can this knowledge be used predictively and methodologically to gain insight into the future strategic behavior of nations? This chapter addresses this issue through an examination of the two principal applications of the concept as outlined above. The objective is to provide a more fundamental understanding of the concept itself and to look more closely at a possible methodological approach and application of the idea.

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<sup>66</sup>Ken Booth, "American Strategy: The Myth Revised," in Ken Booth and Moorehead Wright, eds., *American Thinking About Peace and War*, (Sussex, UK: The Harvester Press, 1978), Chapter 1, pp. 1-35.

## B. STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENON

The most basic function of strategic culture is descriptive, but what exactly it is to describe is unclear. Even the strongest proponents of this construct appear divided on this issue. Colin Gray, for example, believes that strategic culture describes the "modes of thought and action with respect to force" that *a nation and its citizens* hold. He argues that this "derives from perception of the national historical experience" and the "aspiration for self-characterization."<sup>67</sup> Gray's usage of the concept seems to imply that the strategic culture is nothing more than a subset of the cultural values of a society, i.e., a subset that describes the assumptions and values that a nation applies (as a group) to the resolution of questions about the use of force as an instrument of national policy.

Another proponent, Jack Snyder, describes strategic culture quite differently. In his path-breaking 1977 RAND study, Snyder implies a much more limited and yet specific application of the concept as a descriptive phenomenon.<sup>68</sup> He seems to believe that the concept is most appropriately used in conjunction with a *specific group* within society, specifically a nation's military "strategists."<sup>69</sup> The following passage clearly illuminates Snyder's view of the concept:

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<sup>67</sup>Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>68</sup>This is Gray's classification of Snyder's study in "National Style of Strategy: The American Example" in *International Security*, op. cit., p. 21

<sup>69</sup>Snyder's study discusses methodology based upon the "generic rational man" versus "Soviet man" and concentrates on the "strategist." He concludes that "it is enlightening to look at Soviet *leaders* not just as generic statesman who happen to be playing for the Red team, but as *politicians and bureaucrats* who have developed and been socialized into a strategic culture that is many ways unique and who have exhibited distinctive stylistic predispositions..." (emphasis added); see *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., p. 4.

It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique "strategic culture." Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of "culture" rather than mere "policy." Of course, attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and the international environment. However, new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the "strategic culture."<sup>70</sup>

Neither application described above is in direct conflict with one another. In fact, Gray admittedly builds on Snyder's initial work and both seem to perceive the concept in a similar manner.<sup>71</sup> However, the difference in application between Snyder and Gray is significant: it is the broad versus the narrow application of the concept that makes definition so difficult. Proponents seem to believe that strategic culture represents "attitudes and beliefs" about some aspects of security matters, but they do not seem to agree on (1) who specifically holds these values or, (2) what they are. To be useful as a tool, the concept must be defined in more than general terms and it would appear that a useful place to start might just be to zero in on what strategic culture may be used to describe.

### 1. Strategic Culture and Military Strategy.

Several authors have used the term in their writings and each indicates that it is associated with a specific nation and the way that nation handles a particular aspect of its "security dilemma." Unfortunately, the applicable aspect seems to vary. The concept is always associated with "the use of force," either real or potential, by a nation to secure

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<sup>70</sup>Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., p. v; Snyder recognizes the effect of "situational contingencies" on specific behavior.

<sup>71</sup>Gray, in both "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security*, op. cit., and *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., says that he bases much of his interest in this subject and the trajectory of his thinking on Snyder's RAND study and Booth's *Ethnocentrism*. Additionally, in *Nuclear Strategy*, he analyzes both the U.S. and Soviet "styles" (and by extension, their "strategic culture").

political objectives; this seems to be true even if the objective is solely "defense." In this regard, one would assume that strategic culture involves the "assumptions" that guide the use of force and military strategies.<sup>72</sup>

Gray and Snyder have done the most influential work on this subject, but they have only defined the concept in terms of the particular issues addressed in their studies.<sup>73</sup> Carnes Lord, another defense analyst who wrote specifically on the subject, also failed to provide other than a general definition of the concept.<sup>74</sup> This shortcoming is heightened when one considers the broad topic areas that the three authors addressed as the subject of their inquiry. Gray and Snyder examined some aspects of Super Power nuclear strategy while Lord critiqued "military strategy" and the U.S. "way of war." Gray's efforts are the most extensive and his *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* is definitely the most comprehensive study on the effects of a "strategic culture" to date. For this reason it is worth looking at closely.<sup>75</sup>

Gray's extensive study examines the "dominant concepts" of U.S. nuclear strategy, including deterrence theory, strategic stability, escalation control and crisis

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<sup>72</sup>This assertion is reinforced when one considers the "official" *definition of military strategy*: "The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force." *JCS Pub. 1*, Department of Defense "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 January 1986), p. 228.

<sup>73</sup>According to Snyder, strategic culture may be defined as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that *members of a national strategic community* have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy. In the area of strategy, habitual behavior is largely cognitive behavior." (emphasis added); *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>74</sup>According to Lord, "strategic culture" is "the *fundamental assumptions* governing the constitution of military forces and the ends that they are to serve" (emphasis added); see "American Strategic Culture," in *Comparative Strategy*, op. cit., p. 271.

<sup>75</sup>This portion of the study will look at some of what Gray has written on the U.S. "strategic culture" in order to get toward a basic understanding of his use of the concept. He has written similarly on the Soviet Union, but this will be covered in more detail in the next chapter.



management. He contrasts U.S. theories against his understanding of Soviet nuclear doctrine, and concludes that the U.S. had erroneously contrived a nuclear strategy against a "fictional" Soviet Union:

I believe that U.S. incomprehension of its own and Soviet strategic culture and national style has misled U.S. policy-makers and, as a consequence, has led to the making of poor policy... The United States developed a strategic force posture, endorsed strategic doctrinal concepts, and pursued arms control agreements vis-a-vis a substantially fictional Soviet Union....[T]he Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, did not (and does not) share the U.S. approach to deterrence; has no vision of strategic stability that is even remotely congruent with that dominant in the United States; is dismissive of our [U.S.] traditional, doctrinally authoritative theory of escalation control and crisis management; and view arms control negotiations as an instrument for waging political struggle.<sup>76</sup>

One can see that Gray applies the concept of strategic culture as a determinant of policy in general and of national nuclear policy in particular. The "policies" Gray assails are those generated in the form of "Defense Guidance" (or NSDM, NSDD, PD., etc.) by successive American Administrations from Presidents Eisenhower through Carter. "Policy guidance" then became the "objectives" of the "national military strategy" which in turn drove nuclear force posture, arms control, and alliance relationships for the U.S.<sup>77</sup> Gray contends that these policies, and their "outputs" in the form of nuclear force posturing, arms control, and alliance relationships, have been impaired by "little more than the character of [U.S.] culture."<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., p. ix.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid*, Chapter 1, "Nuclear Weapons and World Politics," pp. 1-32.

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid*, p. xi.

In Gray's assessment, certain aspects of U.S. culture are reflected in a number of what he calls "national beliefs" about the American military experience.<sup>79</sup> These beliefs, he claims, inform, in turn, the strategic culture that has dominated U.S. nuclear policy and strategies for the past forty years. Those beliefs, he says, reflect what Americans have collectively learned about "questions of war or military force" throughout the history of their country and, as such, have been conditioned by uniquely American "strategic-cultural" legacies.<sup>80</sup> The effect, argues Gray, is that American strategy has been dominated by *attitudes* that may be said to form some of the content of the strategic culture.<sup>81</sup> According to Gray, the U.S. defense community, drawing upon the cultural and historical legacy of the U.S., came to adopt "uniquely American" attitudes about national security in

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<sup>79</sup>Gray: "American's have tended to *believe*": (1) that "good" causes triumph; (2) that the United States can succeed in anything that it pursues energetically; (3) that Americans cannot fail; (4) that the U.S. can out-produce any enemy in the material needed for victory. (emphasis added); *Ibid*, p. xi, 42-43. See also Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles: Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), especially Part II, "America's Style", pp. 87-216.

<sup>80</sup>He admittedly draws his conclusions from the works of others, especially, John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 1 (1971), pp. 205-228; and Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Policy and Strategy*, op. cit.

<sup>81</sup>Gray implies (although he does not elaborate) that these so-called "legacies" form a good part of the linkage between the *host* culture and the "strategic culture" in the U.S. It is here that he seems to offer explanation for his lack of front-end analysis on the concept itself: "One could, and perhaps should, dwell on the strategic-cultural legacy of continental insularity and isolation from truly serious security dangers, on the conditioning effect of living with weak, non-threatening neighbors on one's frontiers, on the experience of taming a frontier of continental dimensions, on the enduring impact of fundamentalist religious beliefs... and so on. Although Bernard Brodie was correct in his assertion that "good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology," the starting point for the professional strategists should be with the subject that he understands best--strategy---and *not with cultural anthropology*." (emphasis added) *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., p. 40.

the nuclear age and these have come to represent what the U.S. strategic culture assumes about nuclear issues.<sup>82</sup>

Snyder's theorizing shows a similar trajectory. In *Soviet Strategic Culture*, he also concentrates on particular aspects of U.S. nuclear strategy, notably, "escalation control." His study, commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, sought to determine how the Soviet Union would view U.S. efforts at intra-war deterrence and use of "limited nuclear options." His interpretation of the "intellectual history" of U.S. nuclear strategy is similar to Gray's. He concludes that theories on "escalation control," "intra-war deterrence," and "limited nuclear options" are solely U.S. notions. He says that they are the products of a "game-theoretical speculation" style of decision-making that dominates in the American defense community today as it has since the early 1950s.<sup>83</sup> When he contrasts U.S. to Soviet nuclear theory, he concludes that they are quite dissimilar because of differences in *perspective*. He emphasizes, however, that a great deal of the difference in perspective

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<sup>82</sup>The "strategic-cultural" attitudes to which Gray refers pertain specifically to nuclear issues. He says that the U.S. defense community, in common with the American people, have come to *believe* (1) nuclear superiority could not be achieved or sustained and was unnecessary to secure national security; (2) that technology, in the form of increasingly sophisticated and deadly nuclear weaponry, had caused a "strategic deadlock"; (3) that the U.S. military was in an unending quest for larger forces that could, in reality, achieve no meaningful "military benefit"; and (4) therefore, a quest for "damage-limitation" was nothing more than fuel for a senseless "arms race." The *beliefs* accordingly drove *attitudes* and these are reflected in the nuclear policies and strategies of the period 1960-1980. The *attitudes* are (1) that nuclear war cannot be won; (2) that other cultures would come to share this "special knowledge" with the U.S.; (3) that U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union would have constructive results; (4) that the U.S. "military-industrial complex" was as dangerous to world peace as the Soviet Union; (5) that the U.S. was, and would always remain, technologically superior to any foe; (6) that "managing" the "strategic balance" was more important than realistic "defense planning"; (7) that there was a "rhythm" to defense behavior that would allow Americans to respond by mobilization if necessary to respond to a foe. *Ibid*, pp. 50-56. There is a striking similarity between this list and one entitled "non-issues" put together by Herman Kahn in "An Overview," to *Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 23-53.

<sup>83</sup>Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., p. 5. The influence of "game theory" on U.S. strategic thinking is also covered in Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1983), passim, and Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), especially Chapter 12, Section 5: "The Formal Strategists," pp. 175-189.

(and by implication, the strategic culture) is the result not only of *who* has does the theorizing, but also of *how*. According to Snyder, the American strategist had been influenced by experience and cultural predisposition into adopting a "game-theoretical conception" of strategy that leads to belief in "universal truths."<sup>84</sup> The Soviet strategist has a dissimilar set of "truths." He observes that:

American strategy has been developed in a large part by civilian intellectuals and systems analysts who are by nature enamored of such concepts. Soviet strategy, by contrast, has been developed largely by professional military officers, whose natural inclination, one might suppose, would be more oriented toward military effectiveness than game-theoretical elegance.<sup>85</sup>

As opposed to their U.S. counterparts, Soviet leaders have been conditioned by a significantly different set of cultural and historical experiences.<sup>86</sup> This has resulted in a radically different perspective on nuclear strategy and one, he claims, that does not bode well for successful implementation of U.S. plans for "intra-war deterrence" or successful "escalation control." The inconsistency, Snyder argues, is the result of differences in strategic thinking that reflect "separate and distinct strategic cultures in the two countries."<sup>87</sup>

One can see both similarity and discontinuity in the conceptualization and usage of the concept of strategic culture in the works of Gray and Snyder. The similarity is that they

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<sup>84</sup>*Ibid*, p. 6.

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>86</sup>Several "factors" that conditioned Soviet strategic thinking according to Snyder are: (1) The unique Soviet strategic position and circumstances that lead to a preponderance of conventional forces; (2) historical legacies from World War II; (3) Marxist-Leninist modes of analyzing the strategic balance and the world "correlation of forces"; (4) the Soviet technological and economic base which has been inferior to its primary competitor; (5) the bureaucratic politics of the Soviet totalitarian and one-party system. *Ibid*, p. 8.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid*, p. 22

both perceive of the notion as a description of the *attitudes, beliefs, and modes of thinking* about nuclear issues, hence the "cultural" nature of the phenomenon. They also appear to concur on the effect that it has had on defense decision-makers in both countries. It seems, however, that they see dissimilar origins of the "strategic culture." Gray implies that it is a function of the U.S. culture *writ large* and is differentiated from the other "cultural baggage" in the minds of defense analysts only by the focus of specific defense issues. Snyder does not disagree with this assertion, but he seems to imply that it flows from a "group" function within the national defense decision-making community. They are probably both correct and this fact becomes evident when one attempts to examine the concept as a tool for use in predictive analysis.

### C. STRATEGIC CULTURE AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL

The study has shown that the concept of a strategic culture is used to describe the cultural phenomena that condition the international behavior of nations. Although Snyder, Gray and Lord's definitions differ in scope and content, they all seem to agree that specific aspects of a nation's security behavior may be significantly influenced by cultural predispositions. However, in each case, the definition provided was limited to the topic of inquiry in the particular study. This would seem to limit application of the concept of strategic culture when, in fact, its potential would seem far greater. For the concept to be universally valid, however, especially if it is to be used as an analytical construct, it will need to be defined specifically and stand alone apart from the artifacts it is said to create. The definition of the concept of culture provided herein meets this criteria. It only requires the "strategic" modifier. Culture, by definition, is (1) a pattern of assumptions that (2) a group learns as it deals with problems of (3) internal integration and (4) external adaptation. Therefore, if valid, a "strategic culture" must consist of these elements. If this is correct,

then one should be able to apply this framework to a specific nation to ascertain the content of a unique national "strategic culture." Such knowledge could then be exploited for both predicative and heuristic purposes.

Based on the discussion of culture in chapter II of this study, one should be able to see how this framework can be applied to a specific nation. However, it is also clear that the strategic behavior of a nation is not influenced by every member of "the group." The task of providing for the national security is the responsibility of the government, or rather of specific sub-groups within the government, the "national command authorities." By this design, the nation becomes the "group," or host, and the "security community" a "sub-group" within the host. This sub-group is what Jack Snyder referred to as the "defense community," and it may be approached as the group that holds the nation's strategic culture.

### **1. The Security Community Group**

Recognizing the "security community" as a sub-group within a nation assumes that the host's "primary tasks" and core missions are also those of the sub-group and that therefore its products are consistent with the goals of the "host group." However, the security sub-group has been assigned the unique mission of providing plans, programs and strategies to ensure the host nation's security. Therefore, the "primary mission" of the security community becomes "strategic" by definition.<sup>88</sup> The group came together as a function of necessity for the host government and its continued existence as a group is obviously a function of its success in preventing the host nation's destruction or conquest.

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<sup>88</sup>This assumption does not discount the obvious argument that could be made in saying that once constituted as a separate group the "security community" develops a new "primary task" of its own: to ensuring its own continuation as a group. This study will not go down this path and explore the implications for theories of bureaucratic politics that this notion engenders.

As a defined group<sup>89</sup> with a "primary task" and criteria for survival, the security community group must attend to its maintenance functions, and these are satisfied initially by (or develop in conjunction with) the "culture" of the host nation and, over-time, by the new assumptions, rules, and patterns of behavior that the group develops from within.<sup>90</sup> Of course, the "external adaptation" issue that dominates group attention is the strategic mission of the nation.<sup>91</sup> As such, the cultural predispositions of the group, whether they are acquired from the host or developed as a group function, will be reflected in the strategies developed for use in the external (international) environment.

## 2. Strategic "Assumptions"

The strategic assumptions that are of the most concern to analysts are those directly related to the group's primary mission. They would be *de facto* reflections of not only the "core assumptions" of the host nation, but also the specific *strategic* assumptions

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<sup>89</sup>This appears to be the most quarrelsome aspect of the proposed methodology. Group definition may not be as clear or definitive as the methodology requires. In the case of the United States, for example, just who comprises a hypothetical "security community" is itself quite a problem. The major constituents are obvious, but the effect on the defense decision-making process that "unofficial" players (such as business and academia) have must be resolved if the methodology is to be realistically employed. The case of the Soviet Union has, until quite recently at least, been significantly different. Western analysts have traditionally believed that security strategy formulation lay mainly in the domain of a well-defined group: the Soviet military. However, as Snyder noted in his study (and as events inside the Soviet Union would tend to confirm), this may well be changing as "non-traditional" elements in the Soviet society begin to have a say in defense matters; as a result, the Soviet "strategic culture" may be in "transition" as it wrestles with new integration and adaptation issues. See Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., discussion on "strategic sub-cultures," pp. 10-11.

<sup>90</sup>As Snyder noted: the "strategic culture" "sets the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic debate" with the security community" (emphasis added); Therefore, one could conclude that, by definition and Snyder's observation, "strategic culture" performs "internal maintenance" functions for the security community group. *Soviet Strategic Culture*, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>91</sup>There are obviously "external adaptation functions" related to the daily activity of operating as a "group" in the government that will reflect strictly the "organizational" or "bureaucratic" culture of the group, but this issue is not addressed herein. For an interesting account of "bureaucratic politics" within the U.S. security community (Department of Defense), see Carl Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, A RAND Corporation Research Study, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University press, 1989).

that the security group has about the various aspects of providing for the nation's security. As portrayed in Figure II-1, assumptions drive values and artifacts. Therefore, a specific "type" of strategy (such as nuclear, conventional, "low-intensity," or even psychological) as a "artifact" of the culture would reflect these assumptions.<sup>92</sup> One would posit that this group of assumptions would include such considerations as:

1. The utility and legitimacy of military force as an instrument of policy.
2. The nature of international relationships.
3. The national role in the maintenance of international order.
4. The realistic military effectiveness of specific weapons systems and tactics.
5. Civil-military relations.<sup>93</sup>

The above listing is by no means complete but is presented as an example of the types of strategic assumptions that the group is likely to make or have acquired from its parent society. The assumptions answer some of the basic concerns of how to think about, perceive, and resolve national defense issues in the contemporary international environment. Such assumptions would obviously prescribe the types of security strategies generated by the group. For instance, if the group *preconsciously assumes* that war is immoral under any circumstance and that the use of force to compel human activity no matter the reason is "morally" (hence culturally) reprehensible, then one could expect (1) that the group's "value system" and (2) "artifacts" (such as the "security strategy," if any)

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<sup>92</sup>Using this methodology, one could argue that Gray, Snyder, and Lord had "levels of analysis" problems. They were concentrating on "values" (beliefs and attitudes are "testable in the social environment" and hence considered values) and "artifacts" (a nuclear strategy, like the technology associated with it is an artifactual reflection of the culture) and only skirted the "assumptions." For example, some of the "beliefs" and "attitude" Gray outlined are second-order consequences of the "strategic assumptions" outlined above.

<sup>93</sup>Some elements of this listing were taken from Lord, "American Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy*, op. cit., p. 272 and Frederick Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, no. 3, (September 1988), pp. 36-39.



would be non-violent. The example may be extreme, but one cannot deny that the tradition of warfare as an instrument of policy is in political (cultural) disfavor in the West--- one could argue that the West has "learned" that warfare is, under most circumstances, counter-productive and that it has become an instrument of the last resort.<sup>94</sup> As a result, if one understood this assumption to be true, it may be concluded that war, in the Clausewitzian sense, i.e., "as a continuation of policy by other means" has become an inoperable doctrine, and warfare an unusual contingency.<sup>95</sup> Knowing this, one could hopefully understand the "just war" circumstances and plan for them.<sup>96</sup>

A nation's basic cultural assumptions about the nature of war in the modern world are going to prescribe whether or not that nation is a "threat" to other culturally dissimilar nations in the world. This is, of course, not in all cases going to be the principal determinant (as the "just war" conundrum implies), but it does nonetheless imply "tendencies," as Gray would say. Likewise, a nation's assumptions about both the international environment and its role in it also portend much about how that country perceives and rationalizes military behavior toward neighbors. No nation yet assumes that the current international environment is other than anarchistic and with no supra-national police force or effective United Nations to corral intransigent nations in the "community." Therefore, each nation, by itself and in conjunction with other like-minded allies, provides

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<sup>94</sup>See for example Carl Kayser, "Is War Obsolete?" a Review Essay of John Mueller's *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), in *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4, (Spring 1990), pp. 42-65. Although he disagrees with Mueller's thesis that war has become "sub-rationally unthinkable" he does concur that "conscious attitudes toward war (which the author acknowledges are "cultural" attitudes) have indeed changed." p. 62, (emphasis added).

<sup>95</sup>Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Peter Paret and Michael Howard trans. and eds., (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87.

<sup>96</sup>For an excellent synopsis of "seven doctrines of moral war" which includes the "Principled Pacifist" and "Just War Defense," see Eric Mack, "The Moral Basis for National Defense," in Robert W. Poole, Jr., eds., *Defending a Free Society*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 1-31.

for its own security. However, there are basic and fundamental differences in perception about who is a "benign" player in the environment. As an example, some nations believe (based upon cultural assumptions) that there are religious "infidels" in the world that deserve eradication. Radical "Muslim fundamentalists" seem to act as though this were so and they have gained governmental power in at least one state (Iran); others may follow. At the same time, orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine *assumes* the inevitability of conflict between social systems and that therefore the international environment is, by definition, hostile as long as opposing social systems exist.

Finally, to use a Soviet phrase, the "military-technical" assumptions about specific weapons systems also drive security behavior. This is especially true in the nuclear age and has been brought into sharp relief in the debates about weaponry in the West. The answer to the question of whether war is acceptable or not and under what circumstances it is guides strategic thought. However, the strategic community ultimately "learns," and comes to make assumptions about, the utility (or "morality") of specific weapons systems. This is particularly true of weapons of mass destruction. As an example, one can now recognize convergence on *assumptions* that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have concerning nuclear weaponry and warfare, i.e. "utility only in non-use."<sup>97</sup> However, one should also recognize the potential for misunderstanding of the *source* of this apparent convergence. Whereas nuclear weapons have long been seen as "immoral" and "counter-productive" by some American standards,<sup>98</sup> they were never "immoral" in an amoral communist nation

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<sup>97</sup>Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>98</sup>See, for example, Robert E. Osgood, *The Nuclear Dilemma in U.S. Strategic Thought*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); and Michael Vlahos, *Strategic Defense and the American Ethos*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). Both of these authors discuss in detail the effects of a influential group of American strategic thinkers who believe in the "immorality" of nuclear weapons. Osgood calls this "sub-group" the "abolitionists," p. 7.; Vlahos calls this group the "purifiers."

and are only recently being recognized as counter-productive.<sup>99</sup> In both Soviet cases, the apparently new assumption evolved for different reasons than it had in the U.S.<sup>100</sup>

#### D. SUMMARY

This chapter has reviewed the principal usage of the concept of strategic culture. It has been shown that proponents of this type of defense analysis use this concept as (1) a term to *describe* the culture (in assumptions and beliefs) that a nation's security community holds and, (2) as a *tool* to see how this may be used to understand the behavior of that particular group. Finally, Schein's definition of the levels and contents of culture was applied specifically to the case of a theoretical "security community" sub-group believed to exist in a nation. Examples of the strategic assumptions were presented to demonstrate how this model of culture applies in this case. Hopefully one will accept the admittedly incomplete listing of the fundamental assumptions said to constitute a portion the strategic culture. It is merely presented as an example of the *types* of strategic-cultural assumptions that describe the specific content of the concept. However, the disclaimer at the beginning of this chapter holds firm: the field is still immature. It is in what Gray calls a "rudimentary, or pre-theory, stage today."<sup>101</sup> This chapter looked closely at the theory and has described one methodological approach to the subject. There are recognizable difficulties in applying the framework: group definition and "strategic assumption" both

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<sup>99</sup>Stalin rejected the "revolution in military affairs" that nuclear weapons were said to have created. This resulted in an assumption that nuclear weapons were nothing more than a new, more destructive type of "artillery." This belief has changed but it is not because they now recognize the inherent "immorality" of the weapon.

<sup>100</sup>It would seem that orthodox Marxist determinism which rejected the "revolution in military affairs" ushered in by nuclear weapons has been forced to accept that nuclear weapons presented a "survival threat" to communism and therefore had to be dealt with in spite of the ideological dilemma it presented.

<sup>101</sup>Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., p. xii.

present the analyst with definitional difficulties, but the concept itself seems to have validity. However, it would appear that the methodology, if applied at the proper level of analysis, can be made to work. One need only separate assumptions, from beliefs and artifacts, and apply the results to a behavioral model. The next chapter makes an attempt at this by building upon the *strategic* culture model presented in this chapter.

## V. NATIONAL STYLE IN STRATEGY

Different nations behave differently. This observation is so well known that it is rarely scrutinized. Yet, explanations for this phenomenon are legion. This study has looked at a relatively unexplored explanation, and proposes that a nation's strategic culture is one factor that conditions national behavior. One should not misread this assertion as advocacy of mono-causality because, clearly, many other factors are at work as well. However, one cannot ignore the influence of culture on behavior, and the belief that this notion holds true at the national level cannot be discounted because of incomplete or under-developed theory. The evidence presented thus far would tend to support those who argue in favor of "cultural and stylistic analysis." One of the most compelling justifications for this type of foreign and defense policy analysis lies in the fact that nations *do* behave differently, and they seem to do so in a manner that is both *consistent* and *recognizable* over time. This phenomenon is described as a "national style." It has been dealt with extensively by students of U.S. foreign policy, but only recently has it been applied specifically to national security behavior.<sup>102</sup>

The idea of a national style is the logical consequence of the belief that a nation's culture affects its behavior. "Style" implies, by definition, repetitive and predictable behavior; this study has shown that behavior is conditioned and predisposed to certain types of behavior by cultural determinants. The study has also examined one explanation for national behavior through the concept of strategic culture. However, there are certainly

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<sup>102</sup>For example, in addition to Robert Dalleck's *American Style of Foreign Policy*, op. cit., see Elting E. Morison, eds., *The American Style*, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958) and Stanley Hoffman, "America's Style," in *Gulliver's Troubles*, op. cit.

other reasons for specific behavior, but they do not preclude recognition of culture's influence.<sup>103</sup> Nevertheless, national style cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of how cultural determinants produce repetitive behavior. As reviewed in the previous chapter, the methodology which permits one to see the cause-and-effect linkage in these concepts is still incomplete. However, the results are at least recognizable.

#### A. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND NATIONAL STYLE

The previous chapter examined the concept of strategic culture in some detail, but the reader may not be convinced that this concept helps explain or predict international behavior. This chapter addresses that concern. One methodological approach to strategic culture was demonstrated in the previous chapter. The proposed approach seeks to locate the basic strategic assumptions that guide behavior. These assumptions are said to underpin thought and action by the "security community" on specific issues of national defense. The relationship between assumptions and behavior is said to create a national style for resolving security issues that is "a truth by definition."<sup>104</sup> When considered as such, a nation's style may be recognized as an *artifact* of its strategic culture. It is, by definition, an "overt behavior pattern" and it may be causally linked to the cultural assumptions that the group holds about the specific activity in question.

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<sup>103</sup>One could easily argue, for example, that a nation is restricted in its ability to act on the international stage by its capabilities (or lack thereof), by the anarchistic "structure" of the international system, or because of its own political system. However, each of these conditions the way the "group" *thinks* about the external environment and over time it *learns* to behave according to its capabilities and within its limitations.

<sup>104</sup>Gray says that a "*national style is not the random product of imaginative thinking by policy-makers; instead it is a pattern of national response to challenge which has worked adequately in the past. This is really a truth by definition because a strategic culture and national style that failed to meet objective tests of adequacy imposed by external security politics would lead inexorably to the political, if not physical, demise of the nation.*" (Emphasis added); from "Comparative Strategic Culture," *Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College*, Vol. XIV, No. 4, (Winter 1984), p. 29.

This study has demonstrated the linkage between culture and behavior, and it has examined a hypothetical construct that offers the potential to show the existence of a similar linkage between culture and national behavior. This portion of the study looks at a conceptual model to more clearly illustrate this relationship. The concept of strategic culture was examined in the previous chapter, and its principal usage as a descriptive phenomenon and analytical tool reviewed. The chapter concluded that the idea appears valid although the methodology used to accurately describe and give texture to the concept is incomplete. The limitations of theory are acknowledged, however, strategic culture is used herein to describe a set of assumptions. Those assumptions underpin the military strategy a nation contrives to satisfy a primary external adaptation issue: defense in the international environment. Furthermore, these assumptions are said to reside in the minds of individuals who make up a nation's security community while representing the culture of both the host society and the distinct security group. Existence of a "security group" as a distinct sub-group within a host nation is a key assumption. It appears valid even though it is difficult to conceptually bound such a group. The study proceeds on the assumption that the concept is valid.

The previous chapter also presented examples of the assumptions that the security community has or has made about elements of its "strategic" mission. One will recall that assumptions form the most basic component of a culture, and that they condition and influence a group's value system and overt behavior. This relationship is believed to exist in the case of the strategic culture and security community as well. For example, *military strategy* is, by cultural accounting, an "overt behavior" that reflects the culture of the

security community and the parent nation.<sup>105</sup> However, this study does not assert that all individual or collective behavior is solely a function of cultural predispositions. As Herskovitz has noted: "culture is not a straight-jacket, it is but a loose garment."<sup>106</sup> Its impact on behavior is significant because it forecloses *options*, but other elements in the environment also have influence on behavior under certain circumstances.<sup>107</sup>

Culture is said to produce a unique *style* of behavior. In the case of nations, the style is said to reflect consistency in the way nations behave in the international environment. This notion has been applied to a number of specific behavior patterns related directly to a nation's foreign and defense policies. The concept of strategic culture, however, is specifically associated with the *strategic* behavior of nations. Its influence is seen in how nations operationalize their defense policies. This chapter examines this notion by providing a model of strategic behavior and applying this to a case study of the contrasts between U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategic behavior.

### 1. Modelling National Behavior

Much of the criticism levelled at those who offer culture as a cause of national behavior is based on the fact that it is difficult to demonstrate direct linkage between cultural assumptions and specific behavior. The concept of strategic culture is beset by the same criticism. This section describes how specific types of strategic behavior may be linked to the notion of a strategic culture by adapting a model that has been proposed in the field of

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<sup>105</sup>At least one defense commentator has argued that the U.S. is unable to create a coherent, long-term strategy because of uniquely American cultural impediments. See Steven Metz, "Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?" in *Military Review*, Vol. LXIX, No. 5, (May 1989), pp. 9-15.

<sup>106</sup>Herskovitz, *Cultural Relativism*, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>107</sup>This observation was made by Stanley Hoffman in *Gulliver's Troubles*, op. cit. He states that "America's style" of foreign policy "restricts the area of choice by *closing off certain options*, which are not perceived or the exploitation of which there are no mental and behavioral tools, and also by dictating certain ideas and attitudes whose adequacy is open to doubt." p. 93. (emphasis added).



foreign policy studies. The proposed model was developed specifically to account for the influence of "cultural and societal" variables in the international behavior of nations.<sup>108</sup> In this manner alone the model is unique, but it also makes an important contribution in how "behavior" is defined. This distinction makes the particular model useful in this study.

The creator of this model, Baard Knudsen, concluded that much of the difficulty associating cultural influence to specific behavior is due to how one defines behavior. If, for example, behavior is defined only in terms of *observable events*, then the linkage is blurred by what Schein called the "situational contingencies."<sup>109</sup> The result is that causality appears due more to the environment itself than to cultural determinants.<sup>110</sup> However, Knudsen noted that, by re-working the "output" variable of policy, culture's subtle but discernible influence can, in fact, be observed. Knudsen's recommended solution is a "complex dependent variable" that he describes as both "pluralistic" and "hierarchical." He defines foreign policy behavior as consisting of (1) *orientations*, (2) *sectorial policies/plans of action* and, (3) *specific behavior*. Figure V-1 illustrates this relationship.<sup>111</sup>

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
<sup>108</sup>This model is proposed and preliminarily developed by Baard Knudsen in "The Paramount Importance of Cultural Sources," *Cooperation and Conflict*, op. cit., particularly pp. 104-106.

<sup>109</sup>Schein, *Organizational Culture*, op. cit., p 9.

<sup>110</sup>For example, see Graham Allison's "Cuban Missile Crisis" study re-printed in Reinhart & Strum, eds., *American Defense Policy*, op. cit. Allison determined that there were "rational," "bureaucratic," and "organizational" causes in American behavior during the crisis.

<sup>111</sup>From Knudsen, "The Paramount Value of Cultural Sources," *Cooperation and Conflict*, op. cit., p. 106.

### Foreign Policy Behavior Model



#### CAUSAL FACTORS

#### COMPLEX DEPENDENT VARIABLE

NOTE: Thickness of arrow signifies relative strength of causal relationship

Figure V-1

The Knudsen Model demonstrates that the “output” of a nation’s foreign policy activity is not confined to observed, event-related behavior. He sees the three causal components of his equation as affecting not only events, but also as creating the intellectual and programmatic precursors of specific behavior.<sup>112</sup> Knudsen recognizes that before an nation can act in a specific circumstance, it has developed an orientation (or *style*) that drives both specific action and forethought sectorial policies, and plans about how it perceives it will act. This model describes one way of conceptualizing culture’s influence at the national level of behavior. Knudsen acknowledges, however, that the model is

<sup>112</sup>Knudsen describes “orientation” [which he takes from K.J. Holsti’s *International Politics*, op. cit.] as (1) *attitude* toward participation in international relations in general, and (2) statements about national interests and foreign policy goals. “Sectorial policies” and “programs of action” are “declared attitudes or policy with regard to separate issue-areas, nations, and specific goals.” (emphasis added); p. 105. Additionally, borrowing from Callahan [et. al., *Describing Foreign Policy Behavior*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 299], Knudsen describes “policy” as “a standard used in the making of decisions.” *Ibid*, p. 104.

experimental, and that its application requires further development and more elaborate definition of the content of specific causal variables. The following section adapts the model for use herein and proposes refined variables to demonstrate strategic culture's influence on national behavior.

*a. Strategic Behavior Model*

With slight modifications, Knudsen's model may be adapted for use as a *strategic* or *defense policy* behavior model. By substituting "strategic culture" for "cultural/societal forces" and "national style" for "orientation," the hypothetical relationship proposed by this study can be seen. This adaptation seems consistent with both the implications of the strategic culture variable and with some of the more traditional methods offered for studying the defense policies of nations. The elements presented in one authoritative text on comparative defense policies are used to adapt Knudsen's model.<sup>113</sup> These elements, aggregated under the titles of "national attributes" and "environmental/situational conditions," combine the commonly used causal elements that

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<sup>113</sup>Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). This section draws primarily from the outline of the authors methodology of comparative defense policy studies, chapter 1, entitled: "Defense Policy in Comparative Perspective: An Introduction," particularly pp. 5-6.

effect components of a nation's defense policies.<sup>114</sup> Figure V-2 illustrates the modifications to Knudsen's variables.<sup>115</sup>




Figure V-2

<sup>114</sup>Murray & Viotti categorize these elements in a slightly different manner ("Capabilities for Accomplishing National Security Objectives," "Domestic Determinants," "Defense Decision-Making Process," "International Environment") but for illustrative purposes, "National Attributes" would include most of the "structural" determinants of defense policy behavior. Examples are (1) the political system; (2) the economic system; (3) geographical location; (4) population; (5) level of development; etc. "Environmental/Situational Conditions" would include such elements as (1) the nature of the international system itself; (2) the nation's relative position in the system; (3) threats; (4) alliances; etc. *Ibid*, p. 6-7.

<sup>115</sup>This model is not meant to infer that there is no relationship *between* the causal factors. As demonstrated in Part I of this study, there is significant interaction between the environment and the strategic culture, and the strategic culture and the group's "national" structure; however, this relationship is intentionally not illustrated in this model.

Strategic culture is but one causal variable, however, it has the most significant influence on the constitution of a nation's strategic style.<sup>116</sup> The national style of strategy is then reflected in the other output variables, including (1) sectorial defense policies and programs, and (2) specific event-related behavior. This model demonstrates the linkage between strategic culture and specific types of strategic behavior.<sup>117</sup> The study uses this model in the case of U.S. and Soviet national styles in nuclear strategy in the following section.

## B. NATIONAL STYLE IN STRATEGY: A CASE STUDY

This portion of the study ties the major themes of this thesis together by using the adapted Knudsen Model of national behavior. In order to accomplish this goal, a selected portion of the defense policies of the United States and the Soviet Union is examined to effort illustrate how separate and distinct strategic cultures can affect the way different nations perceive and plan for national defense. The case study at hand is not meant to be exhaustive; it is only meant to illustrate how the concepts and ideas presented herein may be applied systematically to the defense analysis and strategic planning process. Granted, the methodology used in this study requires additional refinement and possibly application

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<sup>116</sup>Categorization of a nation's strategic "national style" is not as simple as with Holsti's "orientations." In the Knudsen Model, "orientations" are describes as "globalism," "isolationism," "neutralism," or "coalition." [See Holsti, *International Politics*, op. cit., pp. 94-101]. However, strategic style appears to vary significantly and it makes generalizations difficult. One could argue that strategic style is closely tied to Holsti's "orientations" because "global" strategies are obviously different than "neutral" ones. However, in the case of two globally oriented nations (such as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), the style of strategy may still differ.

<sup>117</sup>Examples of "sectorial policies and programs" may include: (1) national objectives; (2) national security objectives; (3) national military strategies, etc. Examples of "security behavior" [Murray & Viotu's "Recurring Issues: Defense Policy Outputs"] are (1) weapons acquisitions; (2) force posture; (3) arms control events; (4) use of force incidents. See Murray & Viotu, *Defense Policies of Nations*, op. cit., p. 6.

in other areas of strategy before it can be applied "operationally." But, the models used nevertheless appear valid and this is demonstrated by the following case study.<sup>118</sup>

The contrasting nuclear strategies of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are used to illustrate the proposed effect of a national strategic culture and style of strategy. This topical area was selected for several reasons. First, the nuclear strategies employed by the two countries are different, so much so that scholars have seized upon strategic culture and national style in strategy as key explanations for why this is so. Secondly, this topic is examined because no other area of super power defense policy has received equivalent attention either by the strategist or the national command authority in either country. Finally, nuclear strategy was selected because the efforts of other analysts have provided the type and quantity of data necessary to test the model.<sup>119</sup>

The case study begins with a brief review of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies. This is followed by an examination of some of the strategic assumptions that are believed to guide members of the strategic communities in the two countries. These assumptions are then linked to strategic beliefs and the artifacts that they are said to create. Finally, using the linkages demonstrated by the strategic behavior model, the study shows how each

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<sup>118</sup>For example, it would seem appropriate to further test the hypothetical models presented herein using other types of defense strategy, such as conventional, low-intensity conflict, etc. There is evidence to suggest that the models will also explain other types of strategic behavior. For example, see Carnes Lord discussion of U.S. conventional strategy in "American Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy*, op. cit., and Colonel James B. Motely's discussion of low-intensity conflict in "US Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy," *Military Review*, op. cit. Both authors cite U.S. strategic culture as affecting strategic behavior in areas other than nuclear strategy.

<sup>119</sup>Most of the data used in this section is taken from the Gray and Snyder studies, but the works of a number of other respected scholars augment and amplify the data from principal sources. The additional sources include Ken Booth, Rebecca Strobe, John Erickson, Benjamin Lambeth, Fritz Ermath, Richard Pipes, Robert Bathurst, Steven Kime, Nathan Leites, and Lawrence Freedman. Specific sources are cited as appropriate.

nation's style in strategy, as an artifact of its strategic culture, shapes specific nuclear policies and the event-related behavior associated with those policies.

### 1. Asymmetrical Strategies

The differences in U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy have been dealt with extensively in the literature.<sup>120</sup> This section highlights those differences, but the reader must appreciate that this case study is not to show *how* the strategy differs, but *why*. For this reason, the review is brief and encapsulated. The reasons offered by defense analysts for differences in nuclear strategy are varied, and cover a wide range of explanatory causes.<sup>121</sup> However, Gray, Snyder and others have said that one of the most important reasons is that separate and distinct strategic cultures guide U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy. Cultural and stylistic analysts believe that strategic culture provides the intellectual and cognitive underpinning of strategic theory and, as a result, prescribes specific strategic behavior. According to this theory, the nuclear strategies of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. must be influenced by cultural determinants.

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<sup>120</sup>Colin Gray observed: "In the late 1970s, American defense commentators discovered what they had known all along---that the Soviet Union did not appear to share many of the beliefs and practices beneficial to the American idea of international order. This should not have come as any surprise, but it did. Although Western strategic literature is replete with warning against the practice of mirror-imaging and projecting American desires and perspectives uncritically upon Moscow, those warnings went unheeded until the late 1970s." from "Comparative Strategic Culture," *Parameters*, op. cit., p. 26. For a useful comparison of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy, see the "country studies" of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., written by Lawrence W. Korb and Edward L. Warner III, respectively, in Murray and Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations*, op. cit. In the "Concluding Perspective" to this text, the editors state that "there is little, if any, doctrinal consensus [on nuclear strategy] between the United States and the Soviet Union." p. 484.

<sup>121</sup>For instance, Rebecca Strobe, in an article on Soviet strategy, concludes that although there appears to be a "style" of strategy (which she defines as "patterns of behavior in the creation and utilization of military power which recur with sufficient frequency to support the hypothesis that they are endemic...", p. 320), it is due to "geography, historical experience, and economic and technical constraints." See "Soviet Strategic Style," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 3, No. 4, (1982), p. 320.

If one accepts that strategy drives event-related strategic behavior in a manner presented by the model introduced in the previous section, then one can conclude that U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies are different.<sup>122</sup> This judgement is based on apparent differences in weapons systems and arms control behavior.<sup>123</sup> It is true that both countries possess similar offensive systems, and superficially, this fact alone would lead one to conclude that the two have similar nuclear strategies. However, upon close examination, significant differences in strategic systems become evident.<sup>124</sup> Probably the most recognizable difference is that the U.S. has not invested in active or passive strategic defense systems; quite the opposite is true for the Soviet Union. Additionally, the two countries have long pursued apparently divergent arms control agendas. These differences are caused by a number of factors, but it appears that they also result from asymmetrical strategic assumptions, the most influential one of which pertains to the effect that nuclear weapons are believed to have had on the nature of war in the modern world.

*a. Strategic Assumptions and Beliefs*

The Soviet Union and the United States have both dealt with the strategic implications of nuclear weapons in the hands of potential adversaries. Each has had to address the fact that there are several nuclear powers and both have therefore had to

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<sup>122</sup>For a contrasting opinion on what drives strategic behavior, see Robert W. Komer, "The Neglect of Strategy," in *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 67, no. 3 (March 1984), pp. 51-59. Komer concludes that "our military posture is shaped by budgets, politics, technical imperatives, and inter-service scrambling" but not by "serious strategy-making." p. 51.

<sup>123</sup>See for example, a study conducted by Arthur J. Alexander, "Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement," *Adelphi Papers*, Number 147 & 148, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1978/79). Alexander claims that 40-50% of Soviet weapons procurement decisions are based on "history, culture, and values." p. 43.

<sup>124</sup>For a synoptic review of the differences in hardware and capabilities, see "A Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Strategic Doctrine," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 10, (Fall 1982), pp. 36-63. Also reprinted in excerpt form in P. Edward Haley and Jack Merriu, eds., *Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 176-185.



consider the possibility of multiple nuclear adversaries. This section concentrates on U.S. and Soviet nuclear theorizing because only these two are the significant nuclear competitors, and their respective strategic programs are aimed principally at each other.

What is interesting to note is that even though each has had to wrestle with a similar security problem, Americans and Soviets have apparently arrived at different conclusions about how to resolve the "nuclear dilemma." On the U.S. side, it is generally accepted that nuclear strategy is based upon the deterrent value of a threat of "assured destruction." This notion holds that a stable (and hence "safe") strategic balance is one in which neither side can rationally consider the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, however, appears to hold a different and more "self-serving" strategic philosophy based upon "useful [military] advantage."<sup>125</sup> These divergent perceptions have resulted in recognizably different strategic behavior that is especially evident in strategic defense-related behavior. It is not disputed that there are a number of reasons for this development. However, the possibility exists that, the core reason is traceable to different strategic assumptions and beliefs.<sup>126</sup>

It appears that there are identifiable differences in the assumptions made about (1) the nature and legitimacy of war in the modern world and, (2) the effect that nuclear weapons have had on the use of force in the contemporary international environment. For example, there is ample evidence to suggest that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have

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<sup>125</sup>John Erickson has described this as a SANE (as opposed to "MAD") strategic paradigm (Survival And National Existence). See "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology, and Style," in John Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger, eds., *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, (Hamden, CN: Archon Books, 1979), p. 28.

<sup>126</sup>With regard to strategic defense systems and strategic nuclear philosophy, this is the essence of the argument presented by Michael Vlahos in *Strategic Defense and the American Ethos*, op. cit. Additionally, see Bernard D. Claxton, "Traditional American Military Doctrine and SDI," in *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1988), pp. 347-359. Claxton concludes that "large-scale [strategic] defense systems are not compatible with the American way of war." p. 357.

fundamentally different assumptions about what constitutes a "just war," and, as a corollary, about how to resolve disputes in the international community. These assumptions may ultimately be absorbed in distinct styles of nuclear strategy. The U.S., for example, has traditionally eschewed warfare as a legitimate means of settling international disputes<sup>127</sup>. Americans are hesitant to become involved in warfare and would rather set an example as a nation that solves problems through diplomacy vice force.<sup>128</sup> Consider the following observation by one American defense commentator:

In the American view, then, war is waged not to seek adjustment of the balance of power, or for any more precise aims, but rather with the purpose of altering or reforming those political circumstances, however they may be defined, which caused the war. *War itself is evil*. Its prevention, similarly, is the overriding goal of policy. (emphasis added)<sup>129</sup>

The Soviet doctrine, like the U.S., also distinguishes between the "just and unjust" wars, but their differentiation is not based on a belief that "war is evil." Rather, to the Soviet strategist, "wars waged by socialist countries against imperialists are, by their

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<sup>127</sup>The same belief may be held in other "mature" Western democracies, especially the United Kingdom. For example, see Michael Howard's study of Western liberalism and modern war in *War and the Liberal Conscience*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1978). See also Edward Hallett Carr discussion of the conflict between the "realist" and "liberal" in Western thinking about war in the inter-war years in *The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). The same conflict can be recognized today. Finally, See Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Times*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1983).

<sup>128</sup>Richard Pipes has asserted that Americans hold the "pervasive conviction" that "human conflicts are at the bottom caused by misunderstanding and ought to be resolved by negotiation rather than force..." From "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," re-printed in Murray & Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations*, op. cit., p. 134. Additionally, Russell Weigley makes a strong case for the "traditional" American aversion to war which, he says, explains the *cyclical style* of American defense preparedness and involvement in wars. See *The American Way of War*, op. cit.

<sup>129</sup>William R. Emerson, "American Concepts of Peace and War." Lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval War College on 17 December 1957. Reprinted in *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 10, no. 9 (May 1958), p. 5.

very nature, just."<sup>130</sup> The Soviet Union does not view warfare as an aberration, but rather as a natural consequence of history, economic competition, and class conflict.<sup>131</sup> Soviet strategists believe that war is an inevitable reality for which they must always prepare, and prepare to *win*.<sup>132</sup> Nevertheless, the Soviet Union does not want war, and war "deterrence" may be a common paradigm held in common by the strategic communities in both Super Powers.<sup>133</sup> However, the way to accomplish deterrence is a function of how the problem is perceived. Apparently, the U.S. strategic community holds the assumption that warfare is generally illegitimate.<sup>134</sup> Therefore, it perceives the issue of settling international dispute as a "bargaining process" in which all parties should realize some

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<sup>130</sup>Uri Ra'an, "Contrasting Views of the Role of Strategic (Politico-Military) Doctrine: Soviet and Western Approaches," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Uri Ra'an, eds., *National Security Policy*, (Hamden, CN: The Shoe String Press, 1984), p. 113.

<sup>131</sup>See Steve F. Kime, "The Soviet View of War," in *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (1980), pp. 205-221.

<sup>132</sup>This is an assumption that devolves from both historical and ideological causes. The Soviet Union, as the heir to Imperial Russia, has a historical appreciation of the recurring possibility of war with neighbors. However, a significant reinforcement to the historical "lessons learned" is engendered by Marxist/Leninist ideology: The *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, for example, states that the Soviet Union will regard a future war as a "decisive confrontation between opposing social systems." Social systems that, according to their ideology, are inevitably in conflict. These points are covered well by Robert Bathurst, in "The Two Languages of War," in Derek Leebaert, eds., *Soviet Military Thinking*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 28-49.

<sup>133</sup>Steve Kime has asserted that the "Soviets do not want war." However, he cautions that nevertheless, they are prepared to fight one in a manner and style that are "more salient than the judgement that the Soviets do not want war." See "The Soviet View of War," in *Comparative Strategy*, op. cit., p. 218. Additionally, Murray & Viotti believe that "deterrence" is the only concept that U.S. and Soviet strategists hold in common, but they note that there is no clear consensus from other analysts on this point. See "Concluding Perspective," in *The Defense Policies of Nations*, op. cit., p. 484.

<sup>134</sup>This assertion does not discount the existence of dissent within the ranks in the U.S. strategic community. As Colin Gray has observed, there are "sub-cultures" within the strategic culture that hold a more Clausewitzian view of war. However, evidence indicates that the dominant viewpoint is that war is illegitimate.

relative benefit.<sup>135</sup> The Soviet Union's approach to deterring aggression is much more unilateral. Robert Bathurst, for example, has concluded that, in effect, there are "two languages of war" spoken by members of the security communities in the U.S. and Soviet Union. He observes that:

What emerges from comparing the two languages of war is that one culture, which thinks of war as external to its normal pursuits, cannot understand another in which war is, and has been for centuries, central to its existence.<sup>136</sup>

In addition to having fundamentally different assumptions about the nature and legitimacy of war in the modern world, it appears that the two strategic communities hold diverging opinions about the effect that nuclear weapons have had on warfare. Again, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the dominant assumptions held by those in the security communities of those countries are different. One could argue that the "nuclear adaptation issue" has been resolved quite differently by each group. U.S. nuclear strategy reflects a basic belief that nuclear weapons have altered the very nature of war or that nuclear weapons can lead to political gain.<sup>137</sup> It follows that there can be no victor in a nuclear war. Therefore, the weapons have logical utility only to deter a potential adversary

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<sup>135</sup>This is Colin Gray's observation in *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, op. cit., Chapter 2. Richard Pipe's also makes this judgement in "Diplomacy and Culture: Negotiating Styles," in Richard F. Staar, Eds., *Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality*, (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp. 154-162.

<sup>136</sup>Robert Bathurst, "Two Languages of War," in Derek Leebaert, eds., *Soviet Military Thinking*, op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>137</sup>This "assumption" can be traced to an assertion made by Bernard Brodie in what appears to be one of the most influential pieces of literature on the subject. He wrote: "Thus, the first and most vital step any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind. The writer in making this statement is not concerned for the moment with who will win the next war in which atomic bombs are used. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose." From *The Absolute Weapon*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 76.

from "irrationally" employing them<sup>138</sup>. Fritz Ermath succinctly sums up the effect that these assumptions have on artifactual U.S. strategy:

The essence of U.S. [nuclear] doctrine is to deter central nuclear war at the lowest feasible levels of arms effort and strategic risk by presenting the credible threat of catastrophic damage to the enemy should deterrence fail.<sup>139</sup>

It appears that U.S. strategists are more concerned with how a war will *start*, rather than what will happen should one begin. Conversely, the Soviet strategist appears more concerned with how a potential war will *end*.<sup>140</sup> This dissimilarity results because the Soviet strategist does not hold to the American assumption about the "disutility" in nuclear weapons. According to those who have interpreted Soviet military writings on the subject, the Soviet strategic community only recognizes that nuclear weapons are more destructive, but not to the point of disutility. Whereas the U.S. strategic belief is that there can be no victor in a nuclear war, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Soviet belief is the antithesis. John Erickson has observed that the Soviet strategist still believes in a "decisive battlefield victory." He argues that "the principle remains the maximum application of military force" in spite of the existence of nuclear weaponry.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>138</sup>This assertion may appear in conflict with the U.S. declaratory policy of "extended deterrence" to its Western Allies, but there is a great deal of dispute over whether or not this policy was ever more than just that---a declaratory policy. See, for example, the discussion of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe by Lawrence Freedman entitled "A Conventional Defense for Europe," Chapter 19, in *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, op. cit., pp. 285-302, especially p. 290.

<sup>139</sup>Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," in Derek Leebaert, eds., *Soviet Military Thinking*, op. cit., p. 51.

<sup>140</sup>This observation is made by Steve Kime, in "The Soviet Way of War," *Comparative Strategy*, op. cit., p. 213.

<sup>141</sup>John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology, and Style," in John Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger, eds., *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, op. cit., p. 34. Richard Pipes makes a similar argument in "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," in Murray & Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations*, op. cit., "victory is possible," pp. 148-149. Benjamin S.

The divergent strategic assumptions held by the security communities in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. drive different *styles* in strategy. Each has a particular way of resolving their unique national perceptions of the nuclear dilemma. As a result, the strategies that have evolved are quite different. This would not be so potentially dangerous were it not for the fact that the U.S. strategy is, for the most part, based on an assumption of *mutual vulnerability*, whereas the Soviet strategy has long been dominated by an emphasis on *war-fighting* capability. The results are seen in asymmetrical strategic behavior that is evident in weapons systems acquisitions and arms control events.

*b. Strategic Artifacts: National Styles in Strategy*

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have different strategic styles. The reason for this includes a combination of causal variables, but this study maintains that cultural factors are central. The discordant U.S. and Soviet estimates of the military value of nuclear weapons is probably only one of a number of cultural asymmetries that have led to the distinctively Soviet and American styles of nuclear strategy-making. Those different values are linked to behavior, which, if repetitive, becomes stylistic. Colin Gray has written extensively on the unique styles of U.S. and Soviet behavior, and the assumptions outlined above are consistent with the beliefs that he enumerated in support of his conclusions.<sup>142</sup> Gray contends that the U.S. strategic style is essentially *managerial* and *cooperative* and

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Lambeth concurs: "victory is possible" according to Soviet beliefs. See "How to Think About Soviet Military Doctrine," also in Murray & Vioti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations*, p. 148.

<sup>142</sup>See FN 79.

based on a belief that all parties share a similar perspective of the "game."<sup>143</sup> Conversely, the Soviet style is much more "zero-sum" and views the East-West conflict that must have winners and losers, *not* mutual advantage. Soviet strategic statecraft is also much more heavily dependent upon the use of force, both domestically and internationally, than is the U.S. style. These inconsistencies in style are, in turn, reflected in event-related strategic behavior. The following section demonstrates the linkages.

*c. Strategic Artifacts: Event-Related Behavior*

The sectorial strategies that the two countries pursue are briefly outlined above: deterrence through mutual vulnerability versus war-fighting. These strategies have produced event-related behavior in weapons acquisitions and in arms control that reflect both the assumptions, beliefs and style of the two countries. As noted above, the most visible difference in U.S. and Soviet strategic behavior with regard to weapons systems is in the area of strategic defenses. One could argue that the presence or absence of these systems is causally linked to the strategic cultures of the two nations. In the case of the United States there is evidence to suggest that the lack of ballistic missile and civil defense stems directly from assumptions made about the (dis)utility of nuclear weapons as outlined herein. If one follows the logic as presented, then one may see that strategic defense is inconsistent with the assumptions held by the American strategic culture.<sup>144</sup> The strategic

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<sup>143</sup>Gray's conclusion of a U.S. "management" style of strategy derives from cultural assumptions that are both strategic and political in nature. This style is said to devolve from the strategic assumptions that were developed as the U.S. strategic community worked through the *adaptation issues* involved in folding nuclear weaponry into traditional strategic philosophies. The "game-theory" rationalists to which both Gray and Snyder refer saw the strategy of deterrence, the problems of escalation control, and the arms race as strategic dilemmas best suited to "rational management." There is evidence to suggest that, by the time Secretary of Defense McNamara left office in 1968, many of the "solutions" to these issues were becoming internalized and had begun to reside in the U.S. strategic culture as assumptions.

<sup>144</sup>This is the essence of the case made by Bernard Claxton in "Traditional American Military Doctrine and SDI," in *Defense Analysis*, op. cit.

theories that have sprung from the U.S. security community cannot accommodate the implications of *defense* against ballistic missiles.<sup>145</sup> By contrast, the Soviet view cannot accommodate a strategy without them. Whereas the U.S. strategist believes that they are unnecessary at best, and detrimental to the "strategic balance" of mutual vulnerability in the worst case, the Soviet strategist apparently believes exactly the opposite.<sup>146</sup> A strong case can be made that these two diverging beliefs were central to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that limited such systems. To many in the U.S., this treaty signalled that the Soviet Union understood and accepted U.S. strategic beliefs, but the evidence is highly inferential at best. A strong case exists that both parties signed the treaty for their own reasons and that those did not coincide.<sup>147</sup> The fact that parties to negotiations have divergent goals when signing agreements is not in itself unusual or necessarily detrimental.

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<sup>145</sup>"The keystone of security in a world populated by powers possessing vast nuclear and conventional weapons: a condition of mutual assured destruction---a condition that must not be jeopardized by the development of ABM systems. Such defensive measures, which seek to develop a significant damage-limitation capacity, and which therefore threaten to undermine the other side's assured destruction capability, only threaten to unbalance the strategic equilibrium and thrust the arms race into a new realm." From Ernest J. Yanarella, *The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972*, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 163. Although Yanarella is speaking to the views of what he terms the "finite containment" school of nuclear strategy, this excerpt succinctly captures the essence of the dominant arguments against BMD and SDI in the U.S. strategic community today.

<sup>146</sup>Steve Kime notes that "there is a strong emphasis in Soviet thinking on the strategic defensive. This is an outgrowth of the notions that victory and survival must not be viewed as hopeless, even in the nuclear age....It is no exaggeration to say that Soviet strategic force posture is based upon a "quadrad" instead of the "triad" notion that influences U.S. thinking. Strategic defensive measures are viewed by the Soviet citizenry as just as important as the three offensive "legs." This is deeply imbedded in the Soviet mindset." From "The Soviet View of War," *Comparative Strategy*, op. cit., p. 213.

<sup>147</sup>John Newhouse, argues that the Soviet Union "learned" the "correct" strategic philosophy from the U.S. and this fact was indicated by their acceptance of the ABM Treaty. See *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, (New York: Holt, Reinhart, Inc., 1973). However, William Van Cleave (among others) counters: "Undoubtedly, the SALT I ABM Treaty has been a "success," if its purpose was to administer the coup de grace to Safeguard and erase the U.S. advantage in ABM research, development, testing, and engineering. Certainly, many experts regard the agreement that way... What the ABM Treaty really did was to encourage Soviet development of a counter-force threat to U.S. land-based deterrent forces." See "The Arms Control Record," in Staar, eds., *Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality*, op. cit., p. 2-3.



However, in the ABM Treaty case it was and remains so today because the U.S. misjudged Soviet intentions to seek unilateral vice mutual benefit. The Soviet negotiators were able to accomplish this because the strategic culture of the United States is fundamentally different than its counterpart in the Soviet Union and members of the U.S. security community failed to recognize this fact. This in itself is a significant "lesson learned" in cultural and stylistic analysis.<sup>148</sup>

### C. SUMMARY

This chapter introduced a conceptual model to more clearly demonstrate the proposed linkage between the concept of strategic culture and the outputs of a nation's strategic planning effort. The model demonstrated that one way of describing these outputs is in terms of a "complex dependent variable" that consists not only of observable, event-related behavior, but also of the cognitive planning efforts that must come before action. This model takes explicit account of the effect of cultural sources on behavior. Although its application to the ABM Treaty has been limited and selective in the application of data, it is nevertheless believed to demonstrate the logical linkage between the individual concepts outlined in this study.

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<sup>148</sup>According to Van Cleave, "Arms control, when combined with related strategic concepts, helped blind Americans to Soviet motivations and objectives. It also led many to disparage the fundamental political and ideological differences between the United States and the USSR." The strategy led the US to, "(1) reject nuclear superiority; (2) offer parity to the Soviet, in the belief that parity would satisfy them; (3) attribute a role to arms control beyond that originally envisaged; (4) bias strategic programs away from counter-force and damage-limitation and toward assured destruction; and (5) impute U.S. views and goals to the Soviet Union, which resulted in a thorough misunderstanding of Soviet strategic objectives and a chronic underestimation of Soviet strategic programs." *Ibid*, p. 7.

## VI. IN THE MIND'S EYE

This thesis has sought to address the very complex topic of the influence of cultural sources on defense analysis and strategic planning. It is clear that the field is still developing, and that there is a great deal of work left to be concluded if and before the ideas examined can become operational. The concluding discussion summarizes the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

### A. FINDINGS

The study has had two aims. The first was to investigate the influence of culture on perspective and the significance of this linkage for the defense analyst and planner. Next, the study investigated the value of cultural analysis for national security behavior. Toward this purpose, the concepts and methodologies used to describe strategic culture and national style in strategy were examined. During the course of the investigation, several significant findings surfaced. They are summarized below.

#### 1. Culture and Perception

Chapter II illuminated the fact that culture does have a significant influence on how one perceives and judges events in the environment. The process of acculturation was examined and demonstrated to be a social learning tool that group members employ to sustain their unique social environment. The study employed an "organizational approach," introduced Chapter II. This methodology holds culture as unique to a well-defined and socially stable group. The chapter borrowed this approach to look closely at how and why cultures form, maintain, change, and the purposes it serves for the group. Culture was shown to be a distinct phenomenon *unique* to the group to it is associated with. Both

positive and negative effects were examined. It was shown that culture performs vital functions for the group; it binds, defines, and allows the group to survive in the social and physical environment. However, it was concurrently shown that, because culture frames the way people think and act, it can have adverse impact in cross-cultural or inter-group situations.

## **2. Culture and Strategy**

Chapter III looked at the *process* of strategy which was shown to be a problem-solving and decision-making technique employed by the group to achieve desired goals in the environment. Additionally, a group's "strategy" was presented as an artifact, or creation, of that group's culture. The chapter also demonstrated that, as a process, strategy is fundamentally subjective. Therefore, strategic planning was shown to be highly susceptible to the influence of cultural bias and the effects of ethnocentrism. The chapter also reviewed several "strategic planning" models and demonstrated how a culturally biased perspective influences each step in the analysis and planning process. The idea of cultural relativism was presented as the solution to this problem. Cultural relativism was briefly reviewed and presented as an intellectual perspective that allows one to consider the implications of differences in cultural values between groups. In this manner, it is offered as one way to partially escape the negative influence of one's own culturally biased perspective.

## **3. Strategic Culture and National Style in Strategy**

The study applied the findings in Part I to the concepts of strategic culture and national style in strategy. In Chapter IV, the concept of strategic culture was examined to ascertain usage and definition. It was shown that although it receives some use in the field of national security affairs, the concept remains controversial because of methodological and definitional inadequacies. The principal works completed in this genre

were examined and it was discovered that the concept is usually defined depending upon the particular portion of a nation's defense policy under investigation. In other words, no broad definition or methodological approach to the concept was located. This causes confusion when one attempts to define the discrete components of a nation-specific strategic culture. Therefore, the organizational approach to culture was employed to see if this method could be used to link cultural data with national behavior. The study also adopted a general definition of culture as a group function and added the "strategic" modifier. In this manner, the concept was presented as the "culture" that supports a distinct "security-community" sub-group within a nation. This sub-group is assumed to have a "mission" of providing the defense strategies for the host nation and, the culture that serves this group was shown to affect its products. The hypothetical "strategic culture" was then disaggregated into its component parts and presented as "strategic" assumptions, beliefs, artifacts, or overt behavior patterns. This way of approaching the concept was briefly tested to show the linkages between "strategic" assumptions and artifacts. The organizational approach to the topic of strategic culture appears to work, however, it is based on an assumption that one can define or conceptually bind the "security community" sub-group within a nation. This in itself appears to be a very difficult proposition, but one that could be resolved.

Chapter V built upon the notion of a distinct strategic culture and looked at how such a construct could be linked to specific strategic behavior. It was noted that much of the criticism of this type of analysis is due to the fact that linkage is difficult to demonstrate. The chapter adapted a recent model of foreign policy behavior for use as a "strategic" behavior model. This model has a complex dependent variable that offers sensitivity to cultural sources. The outcome variable of this model is described as three identifiable "artifacts" or outputs of a nation's defense policy behavior: (1) a "national style" or a

recognizable way of dealing with defense issues, (2) "sectorial defense plans and policies," that enumerate specific goals, objectives, and strategies, and (3) explicit "event-related behavior" such as weapons systems acquisition, arms control, or use-of-force events. The chapter demonstrated the model using a limited case study of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy. The case study selected hypothetical strategic assumptions believed to be held by the security community in each nation. The hypothetical assumptions concerned the use of force in the contemporary international environment and the effect that nuclear weapons have had on war in the modern world. Using data obtained from various defense analysts, these assumptions were cast against U.S. and Soviet strategic behavior. The chapter demonstrated how specific assumptions can be linked to both a national style in strategy and specific, event-related behavior.

## **B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This study has demonstrated that culture influences behavior and that this information has important consequences for the defense analyst and strategic planner. In this regard, it can assist in strategic decision-making by allowing the planner to see the cognitive product of his own acculturation. The planner must understand and control the character of his own epistemology, because any product that he contributes for use by society must be fundamentally coherent with the dominant values of the society he serves. Secondly, cultural and stylistic analysis can also expose the fundamental cultural assumptions that guide a competitor's behavior. If the planner's task is to devise a strategy to succeed against a specific opponent, then the importance of an understanding of how that opponent thinks, and of what he values, cannot be underestimated.

This study showed that much of the strategy generated by the strategic community in the U.S. was based upon a misunderstanding of the Soviet strategic culture. It has not had

catastrophic results because "the delicate balance of terror" has held firm regardless. However, much of the data and opinions of analysts used in this study pre-date the radical events occurring in the Soviet Union today. This can cast doubt on the conclusion that the model works because the current Soviet Union appears so different from the one painted herein. If, however, the concepts of strategic culture and national style hold true, then the events taking place in the Soviet Union must be consistent with the cultural values that dominate in that country. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the security sub-group in the Soviet Union may well be flux as it wrestles with pressing "adaptation" issues as it seeks to survive in the new environment. U.S. policy-makers must use caution as the events in the U.S.S.R. unfold and not succumb to the temptation of hasty interpretation. One must not neglect the fact that culture colors interpretation of events, and what is occurring in the Soviet Union can only be fully and correctly interpreted from a perspective that comes with an appreciation of that vantage point.

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| 4. | Department of the Navy<br>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/OP-602<br>Room 4E516, The Pentagon<br>Washington, D.C. 20305              | 1 |
| 5. | Department of the Navy<br>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/OP-603<br>Room 4E486, The Pentagon<br>Washington, D.C. 20305              | 1 |
| 6. | CAPT James Stark, US''<br>Executive Director<br>CNO Executive Panel/OP-00K<br>4401 Ford Ave.,<br>Alexandria, VA 22302-0268                  | 1 |
| 7. | Dr. Henry Gaffney<br>Director, Strategic Policy Analysis Group<br>Center for Naval Analysis<br>4401 Ford Ave.,<br>Alexandria, VA 22302-0268 | 1 |
| 8. | CAPT Larry Seaquist, USN<br>Office of the Secretary of Defense<br>Room 4E849, The Pentagon<br>Washington, D.C. 20301-2100                   | 1 |

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| 9.  | <b>RADM William A. Owens, USN</b><br><b>Senior Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense</b><br><b>Office of the Secretary of Defense</b><br><b>Room 3E880, The Pentagon</b><br><b>Washington, D.C. 20301-2100</b> | <b>1</b> |
| 10. | <b>Mr. Robin Pirie</b><br><b>Director, CNO Strategic Studies Group</b><br><b>Naval War College</b><br><b>Newport, R I 02840</b>   | <b>1</b> |
| 11. | <b>Dr. Robert S. Wood</b><br><b>Center for Naval Warfare Studies</b><br><b>Naval War College</b><br><b>Newport, R I 02840</b>   | <b>1</b> |
| 12. | <b>Dr. Donald C. Daniel</b><br><b>Chairman, Campaign and Strategy Department</b><br><b>Naval War College</b><br><b>Newport, R I 02840</b>   | <b>1</b> |
| 13. | <b>Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau, Code 56Bn</b><br><b>Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs</b><br><b>Naval Postgraduate School</b><br><b>Monterey, CA 93943-5000</b>   | <b>3</b> |
| 14. | <b>Dr. Frank M. Teti, Code 56Tt</b><br><b>Department of National Security Affairs</b><br><b>Naval Postgraduate School</b><br><b>Monterey, CA 93943-5000</b>   | <b>1</b> |
| 15. | <b>Dr. Jan S. Breemer, Code 56Be</b><br><b>Department of National Security Affairs</b><br><b>Naval Postgraduate School</b><br><b>Monterey, CA 93943-5000</b>  | <b>1</b> |
| 16. | <b>CDR R. Mitchell Brown, USN, Code 56Br</b><br><b>Department of National Security Affairs</b><br><b>Naval Postgraduate School</b><br><b>Monterey, CA 93943-5000</b>  | <b>1</b> |
| 17. | <b>Dr. David S. Yost, Code 56Yo</b><br><b>Department of National Security Affairs</b><br><b>Naval Postgraduate School</b><br><b>Monterey, CA 93943-5000</b>   | <b>1</b> |
| 18. | <b>Dr. Colin S. Gray</b><br><b>National Security Research, Inc.</b><br><b>3031 Javier Road, Suite 300</b><br><b>Fairfax, VA 22031-4662</b>  | <b>1</b> |



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| 19. | Professor Geoffrey Till<br>Department of History and International Affairs<br>Royal Naval College<br>Greenwich, London, SE10 9NN<br>United Kingdom | 1 |
| 20. | Dr. Robert Jervis<br>Research Institute on International Change<br>105 East 60th St.,<br>New York, NY 10023  | 1 |
| 21. | Col. Frank Zimolzak, USMC, (Ret.)<br>1736 Long Green Dr.,<br>Annapolis, MD 21401   | 1 |
| 22. | Col. Frank C. Chace, USMC (Ret.)<br>4705 Hopkins Dr.,<br>Dumfries, VA 22026  | 1 |
| 23. | LCDR Christopher B. Chace, USN<br>1437 Bayberry Ct. So.,<br>Chesapeake, VA 23320   | 3 |